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Interpretation of TRIPS provisions in a manner consistent with 
human rights instruments: a policy option for the exploration of 
south-south judicial cooperation 
THADDEUS MANU 
School of Law, Criminology and Political Science, University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, 
United Kingdom 
The rigid interface between the enforcement provisions of patents under TRIPS standards and the institutional, 
technical and human resource capacity deficiencies means that political decisions to exploit the TRIPS flexibilities 
to promote access to medicines in the context of Africa is almost an exercise in futility. Notably, the Development 
Agenda under the auspices of WIPO often follows the North-South model, and the failings are well-documented 
in the empirical literature, as this has brought little institutional change. For instance, the judiciary that could 
help to provide an interpretation of the TRIPS flexibilities to promote public health simply lacks capacity. At the 
same time, the Indian judiciary, through the lens of human rights norms, is widely known for its functional activism 
in the interpretation of the TRIPS provisions consistent with public health protection, and is the best example for 
African countries. It is on this basis that this paper attempts a critical exploration of judicial cooperation based 
on a South-South model with a view to underlining its doctrinal significance for African countries. Therefore, the 
author questions the rationality of African countries’ exclusive reliance on so-called North-South capacity 
building and argues that the South-South judicial cooperation model would provide a logical platform that could 
operate alongside the conventional North-South system for building institutional, technical and human resource-
based aspects of capacity for its judiciary to interpret TRIPS in a manner consistent with human rights norms to 
promote access to medicines. 
Key words: Africa; Access to Medicines; Human Rights; South-South Cooperation; TRIPS Agreement 
  
A INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual Property (IP) is protected in law under the presumption that it should foster 
innovations to improve socio-economic welfare.1 The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), in Article 7, is clear on this definitive objective,2 except 
that the language adopted by that Article, which is the ‘objective’ provision of the Agreement, 
suggests that the protection of IP alone does not automatically produce welfare gains.3 With 
this, TRIPS seemingly presumes that something other than the simple strengthening of patent 
                                                 
 t.manu@herts.ac.uk 
1  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (adopted 15 April 1994, entered into 
force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 299, 33 ILM 1197 (TRIPS) art 7. 
2  Carlos M Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Commentary on the TRIPS 
Agreement (OUP 2007) 91. 
3  ibid 97. 
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laws may be necessary to achieve the welfare gains that the members expect from the 
Agreement.4 Importantly, implicit in TRIPS—apart from the notion of socio-economic welfare 
objectives—are essential public interests, which the Agreement envisages as its major 
principles.5  
Still, this is not automatic, and the TRIPS Agreement maintains a basic principle that 
preserves the underlying public policy objectives of members’ discretion to adopt consistent 
measures necessary to protect the public interest.6 Nevertheless, it remains a challenging task 
for predominantly developing countries to put in place IP regimes capable of maintaining the 
TRIPS principles. The IP policymaking process is complex and technical,7 and these countries 
have a limited understanding of IP norms in general and the implications of instituting an 
effective IP protection system.8  
In fact, internal capacity constraint arguments are acknowledged to have substantial merit 
in explaining this failure, as standards often fail to strike the right balance between the interests 
of innovators and the wider public interest.9 Consequently, the protection of human rights is 
undermined, although the primacy of human rights obligations over economic policies and 
agreements is the settled principle.10 Importantly, the right to health is a notion well-founded 
                                                 
4  Michael Halewood, ‘Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses at 
International Law’ (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 243, 259. 
5  Antony Taubman, Hannu Wager, Jayashree Watal (eds), A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement (CUP 
2012) 13. 
6  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), ‘The TRIPS Agreement and 
Developing Countries’ (1996) UNCTAD/ITE/1, 54.  
7  Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development 
Policy (2002) 139. 
8  George M Sikoyo, Elvin Nyukuri, and Judi W Wakhungu, Intellectual Property Protection in Africa: Status 
of Laws, Research and Policy Analysis in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda (Acts Press 
2006) 9. 
9  Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (n 7) 138. 
10  United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights) Resolution (Res) 7 (2000) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/2000/7, cls 2, 3.  
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in international human rights instruments;11 it is also a settled understanding that access to 
essential medicines remains a significant component of the right to health.12  
Nevertheless, it is well-documented in the empirical literature that, while a shortage of 
essential medicines generally appears to be a global issue,13 the implications of this are worse 
in Africa, even though the continent shoulders a disproportionate burden of diseases.14 In 
particular, the patent standards under TRIPS15 and its enforcement provisions are held to be a 
consequential factor.16 Significantly, there are several flexibilities inherent in the TRIPS 
Agreement, all of which could be implemented to counterbalance the impact of exclusive rights 
in order to reduce prices and increase the affordability of medicines.17  
Compulsory licensing is one of the flexible instruments that could be interpreted to 
promote access to essential medicines.18 Compulsory licensing as an instrument of government 
policy remains a significant part of the global IP regime and is consistent with TRIPS. The 
World Trade Organisation (WTO)19 confirmed this position in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
                                                 
11  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR) art 12. See also African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 21 ILM 58 (Banjul Charter) art 16; Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 25; Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 (CFREU) art 35.  
12  Stephen P Marks, ‘Access to Essential Medicines as a Component of the Right to Health’ in Andrew 
Clapham and Mary Robinson (eds), Realizing the Right to Health (Rüffer & Rub 2009) 80, 88. 
13  World Health Organization (WHO) (Executive Board), ‘Addressing the global shortages of medicines, and 
the safety and accessibility of children’s medication: Report by the Secretariat’ (18 December 2015) WHO 
Doc EB138/41 [1]. 
14  WHO (Regional Committee for Africa), ‘Tackling Neglected Tropical Diseases in the Africa Region’ (15 
June 2009) WHO Doc AFR/RC59/10 [3]. 
15  TRIPS (n 1) pt II, s 5. 
16  TRIPS (n 1) pt III. See also World Trade Organization (WTO) (Council for TRIPS), ‘TRIPS and Public 
Health’ (20 June 2001) WTO Doc IP/C/W/296 [5].  
17  World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (Committee on Development and Intellectual Property 
(CDIP)), ‘Patent-Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework and their Legislative 
Implementation at the National and Regional Levels’ (18 August 2010) WIPO Doc CDIP/5/4 Rev [30]. 
18  Nuno Pires de Carvalho, The TRIPS Regime of Patent Rights (3rd edn, Kluwer Law International 2010) 174. 
19  The WTO was established by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (adopted 
15 April 1994, entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 154, 33 ILM 1144 (WTO Agreement). 
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and Public Health (Doha Declaration).20 Notwithstanding this, African countries have 
generally failed to utilise compulsory licensing as an instrument of government policy to 
promote access to affordable medicines, and this is a political decision failure. 
Unless human-rights advocates provide an effective intellectual and organisational 
counterweight to economic interests, the IP landscape will be reshaped in the years ahead 
without adequate consideration of the impact on human rights.21 The central thrust is that IP 
policymaking still remains a sweeping exercise across the globe.22 This has occurred in several 
ways,23 and in most cases the interest of the right-holders is enhanced at the expense of the 
general public.24 Apart from the IP domains under TRIPS, the new wave of IP standard-setting 
under Bilateral Trade Agreements (BTA) is complex and has continually become expansive.25  
These international trade deals have set up powerful legal structures to seal corporate 
power into the enforcement of trade rules.26 Under this approach, developing countries’ 
policymakers are under political pressure to draw up stringent IP regimes in the interest of the 
right-holders and they often ignore the incorporation of public safeguards.27 Notably, 
restrictions and limitations that previously excluded specific types of subject-matter from 
patenting are gradually being eliminated.28 In most cases, these arrangements contain 
                                                 
20  WTO (Ministerial Conference), Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (14 
November 2001) WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Doha Declaration) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm> accessed 23 June 2016. 
21  Audrey R Chapman, ‘Approaching intellectual property as a human right: obligations related to Article 
15(1)(c)’ (2001) 35 Copyright Bulletin 4, 6. 
22  Peter Drahos, ‘Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: the Role of FTAs’ (November 2003) 
<http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/08/drahos-fta-2003-en.pdf> accessed 23 November 2016. 
23  John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation (CUP 2000) ch 24. 
24  Peter Drahos, ‘BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property’ (2001) 4 The Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 791, 804. 
25  Susan Sell, ‘The Global IP Upward Ratchet, Anti-Counterfeiting and Piracy Enforcement Efforts: The 
State of Play’ (2010) PIJIP Research Paper No 15 
<digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=research> accessed 29 
November 2016. 
26  Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade 
(OUP 2008) 73. 
27  Ruth L Okediji, ‘Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection’ 
(2003-04) 1 University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 125, 140. 
28  Chapman (n 21) 9. 
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additional demands on these countries beyond what is required from them under the 
multilateral trading regime.29  
With the complex environment in which IP policymaking subsists, the emergent 
consensus within the international development community is that the ability of developing 
countries, particularly those in Africa, to stimulate socio-economic growth via the conduits of 
the IP regime hinges on capacity building initiatives.30 The WTO recognises this 
presumption.31 Within this notion, the Development Agenda (DA) was prompted in 2005 by 
the initiative of Argentina and Brazil under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO).32 The DA initiative follows the view that, as developing countries 
continue to implement IP-related treaties such as TRIPS and participate in new negotiations at 
the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels, appropriate and effective technical capacity will 
be crucial if these countries are to use IP as a tool for the promotion of human and socio-
economic development sustainably.33 As a specialised agency, the United Nations (UN) 
supports WIPO’s DA. 
                                                 
29  Mohammed K El Said, Public Health related TRIPS-plus Provisions in Bilateral Trade Agreements: A 
Policy Guide for Negotiators and Implementers in the Eastern Mediterranean Region (World Health 
Organisation and International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 2010) 46; Sisule Musungu 
and Graham F Dutfield, ‘Multilateral agreements and a TRIPS-plus world: The World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO)’ (TRIPS Issues Papers 3, Quaker United Nations Office and Quaker International 
Affairs Programme 2003) 2 <www.iprsonline.org/ictsd/docs/WIPO_Musungu_Dutfield.pdf> accessed 24 
November 2016. 
30  Thaddeus Manu, ‘Essential Medicines and the Complexity of Implementing Nationally Based Compulsory 
Licensing: On the Need for a Regional System of Compulsory Licensing in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2014) 36 
European Intellectual Property Review 39, 47; Robert Dibie, Felix Moses Edoho, and Josephine Dibie, 
‘Analysis of Capacity Building and Economic Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa’ (2015) 6 International Journal 
of Business and Social Science 1, 4. 
31  WTO (Ministerial Conference), ‘Ministerial Declaration’ (14 November 2001) WTO Doc 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 [33]. 
32  WIPO was established by the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organisation (adopted 
14 July 1967, entered into force 26 April 1970, amended 28 September 1979) 21 UST 1749, 828 UNTS 3 
(WIPO Convention). See also Christopher May, The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO): 
Resurgence and the Development Agenda (Routledge 2007) 85. The WIPO Development Agenda can be 
found at <www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/> accessed 1 July 2016. 
33  Tom Pengelly, ‘Technical Assistance for the Formulation and Implementation of Intellectual Property Policy 
in Developing Countries and Transition Economies’ (ICTSD Programme on IPRs and Sustainable 
Development, Issue Paper No 11, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 2005) 5 
<www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/Pengelly_TA_FINAL.pdf> accessed 24 November 2016.  
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As per Article 1 of the agreement between the UN and the WIPO, the former recognises 
the latter as one of its specialised agencies responsible for promoting creative intellectual 
activity and for facilitating the transfer of technology related to industrial property to 
developing countries in order to accelerate economic, social, and cultural development, subject 
to the competence and responsibilities of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme, and the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organisation, as well as the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organisation and other constituent agencies within the UN system.34 
Within this recognition, the UN takes a conceptual view that to harness the socio-
economic welfare embedded in the IP system may require capacity from a typical developing 
country perspective.35 The DA has adequate legal backing. Its legal foundation can be inferred 
from several provisions, in particular the Preamble to the TRIPS Agreement and Articles 66(2) 
and 67 of TRIPS. Given that the notion of capacity building is conditioned against the 
implementation of TRIPS obligations, this has resulted in several layers of capacity building 
initiatives directed towards developing countries in general.36 Importantly, consistent with 
Article 66(1) of TRIPS, the WTO/TRIPS Council has extended, until January 2033, the period 
during which key provisions of the TRIPS do not apply to pharmaceutical products in least 
developed countries (LDCs).37  
This decision follows the adoption of the new UN Sustainable Development Goals, 
which affirm the right of developing countries to utilise the TRIPS Agreement flexibilities to 
ensure access to medicines for all.38 The decision also keeps open the option for further 
                                                 
34  Agreement between the World Intellectual Property Organisation and the World Trade Organisation (signed 
22 December 1995, entered into force 1 January 1996) (WIPO and WTO Agreement) 
<www.wipo.int/treaties/en/agreement/trtdocs_wo030.html> accessed 13 July 2016. 
35  Carolyn Deere, The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement and the Global Politics of Intellectual 
Property Reform in Developing Countries (OUP 2009) 197. 
36  Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (n 7) 137. 
37  WTO (Council for TRIPS), ‘Decision on the Extension of the Transition Period under Article 66.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement for Least Developed Country Members for Certain Obligations with respect to 
Pharmaceutical Products’  (6 November 2015) WTO Doc IP/C/73 cl 1. 
38  United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res 70/1 (25 September 2015) UN Doc A/RES/70/1 
(Sustainable Development Goals) Goal 3. 
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extensions beyond that date.39 It is important to acknowledge that, under Article 66(1) of 
TRIPS, many African countries are classified as LDCs, and therefore countries can choose 
whether or not to protect pharmaceutical patents and clinical trial data before 2033. In fact, the 
latest extension, which is specifically applied to pharmaceutical products for LDCs, is in line 
with the well-established principles set by the Doha Declaration in 2001 and the objectives of 
the WIPO DA. 
Importantly, several intergovernmental Organisations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations continue to support developing countries and LDCs in assuring development 
gains from the international trading system.40 With respect to TRIPS, UNCTAD plays a 
significant role in recognising the need to rebalance the IP rules and rule-making to make them 
more flexible and more in line with the public interests, as well as a development-oriented 
framework.41 Usually, technical assistance under WIPO’s mandate reflects a measure that 
appears to be a central component of the organisation’s deliberations, particularly in the context 
of its DA.42  
Despite WIPO playing a leading role in stimulating awareness of the importance of IP 
protection in terms of the socio-economic needs of countries, contributing to the creation of IP 
infrastructure, and enhancing governance mechanisms at the national, regional, and global 
levels towards the implementation and protection of regimes,43 various procedures and outputs 
of the organisation have become increasingly sophisticated.44 Some developed countries have 
                                                 
39  WTO (Council for Trips) (n 37) cl 2. 
40  See, eg, the UN Development Programme, the WHO, OECD, World Bank, UN Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation, South Centre, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Quakers, 
The Consumer Project on Technology, Médecins Sans Frontières, Oxfam, etc. 
41  UNCTAD, ‘Intellectual Property in the World Trade Organisation: Turning it into Developing Countries’ 
Real Property’ (2010) UN Doc UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2006/8 20. 
42  Carolyn Deere Birkbeck and Santiago Roca, ‘An External Review of WIPO Technical Assistance in the 
Area of Cooperation for Development’ (Final Report, prepared for WIPO’s CDIP, submitted 31 August 
2011) 90. 
43  Carolyn Deere Birkbeck, The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO): A Reference Guide 
(Edward Elgar 2016) 8. 
44  Christopher May (n 32) 56. 
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noted the shortcomings within WIPO’s technical assistance and have called for efficiency in 
delivering capacity building initiatives.45  
The chief concern is that WIPO’s patent agenda is to substantially disseminate to 
developing countries the patent systems modelled around the current standard-setting of key 
developed countries’ regimes. However, the majority of this technical assistance is sponsored 
by the patent offices of developed countries.46 Consequently, in delivering technical assistance 
to modernise the legal and administrative infrastructures, the suspicion is that WIPO’s main 
focus is more on the strict compliance of patent provisions than on helping countries to 
implement key flexibilities.47 
Therefore, the time has come where reading human rights norms into IP regimes is 
critical if countries are to neutralise the impact of the stringent IP laws being put in place. 
Importantly, the judiciaries in all countries are called upon to address delicate issues concerning 
liberty, property, and the protection of public interests. Therefore, as an institution, the 
judiciary could help in the promotion of access to medicines in Africa, and in affirming its 
claim as a human right. This is backed up by the fact that domestic courts in some countries 
outside Africa have displayed a growing willingness to use human rights laws to reinterpret 
and even strike down IP laws that impede access to medications.48 
In the same vein, human right arguments can be used to invalidate detrimental IP laws in 
Africa. In other words, human rights standards could serve as a powerful counter-measure to 
the political and economic motives that keep harmful IP laws in place. Significantly, judicial 
                                                 
45  WIPO (CDIP), ‘Proposal by Spain’ (14 April 2016) proposition 3 <www.ip-watch.org/weblog/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/CDIP-New-Spanish-Proposal-April-2016.pdf> accessed 12 August 2016. 
46  WIPO Convention (n 32).  
47  Carlos Correa, ‘Formulating Effective Pro-Development National Intellectual Property Policies’ in 
Christopher Bellman, Graham Duffield, and Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz (eds), Trading in Knowledge: 
Development Perspectives on TRIPS, Trade and Sustainability (Earthscan Publications 2003) 209, 214 
(condemning WIPO for only highlighting the social benefits and largely ignoring the costs of IP rights 
protection and also failing to present the ranges of policy options available for developing countries). 
48  Ole Frithjof Norheim and Bruce M Wilson, ‘Health Rights Litigation and Access to Medicines: Priority 
Classification of Successful Cases from Costa Rica’s Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court’ (2014) 
15 Health and Human Rights 47, 52, find that in Costa Rica, approximately 500 cases concerning the right 
to health have been filed in the courts since 2008. Of those cases, 192 were claims for medications, with 
approximately 50 per cent of claimants winning their cases. 
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articulation of the relationship between the right to health and IP law can not only mitigate the 
detrimental impact of IP law but also legitimise the broader political actions that prioritise the 
right to health over IP protection.  
However, as highlighted earlier, the interface between IP and human rights norms is 
complex. This complexity is compounded by the fact that technological development has 
outstripped legal development. The conceptual thinking is that judges have to apply ‘old’ laws 
to ‘new’ situations, laws adopted without the foresight of how technology will develop.49 
Moreover, cases that use human rights language substantively to attack patent laws are much 
more recent.50  
Additionally, given the complication within which the IP standard-settings subsists—
which sometimes lacks transparency51—a more moderate claim here is that capacity issues 
may render the judiciary less proactive in offering interpretations in defence of access to 
medicines as a significant component of human rights law.52 This is because determining the 
validity of human rights questions of IP regimes often demands difficult value judgments, 
premised on high moral authority. That is, it will be difficult to delineate the specifics of human 
rights obligations in new domains, such as health and IP, and this drawback in turn may feed 
the courts’ fear that IP standards are limitless due to the presumption against conflicts in 
international law.  
Meanwhile, India is a country that has a long history of IP policy which protects the 
domestic health needs of its people.53 More importantly, its judiciary has been a strong 
                                                 
49  WIPO (Advisory Committee on Enforcement), ‘The Role of the Judiciary in Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights: Intellectual Property Litigation under the Common Law System with Special Emphasis on 
the Experience in South Africa’ (19 May 2004) WIPO Doc WIPO/ACE/2/4 Rev [13]. 
50  Hannah Brennan and others, ‘A Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property and Access to Medicines’ 
(Global Health Justice Partnership Policy Paper 1, Yale Law School and Yale School of Public Health, 
September 2013) 20. 
51  Cary Coglianese, Heather Kilmartin, and Evan Mendelson, ‘Transparency and Public Participation in the 
Rulemaking Process: A Nonpartisan Presidential Transition Task Force Report’ (University of Pennsylvania, 
July 2008) 2 <www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/transparencyReport.pdf> accessed 17 February 2017 
52  WIPO (Advisory Committee on Enforcement) (n 49) 13 states that IP enforcement is about a conflict 
between the strong and the weak, the rich and the poor. 
53  Rajesh Sagar, ‘Introduction of Exclusive Privileges/Patents in Colonial India: Why and for Whose Benefit’ 
[2007] Intellectual Property Quarterly 164, 173. 
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protector of public health and maintains a global record for the interpretation of IP rules 
consistent with human rights norms. Notably, in 2012, the Indian Controller utilised the 
compulsory licensing provision under its TRIPS-compliant patent regime to grant a 
compulsory licence to Natco Pharma Limited (Natco), an Indian generic manufacturer, to 
market generic copies of ‘sorafenib tosylate’—marketed as ‘Nexavar’,54—exclusive rights to 
which are held by Bayer.55  
The use of compulsory licensing in India exerted a downward pressure on prices and 
increased the manufacture of affordable generic alternatives of Nexavar for distribution.56 Not 
satisfied with the Indian Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB )57decision,58 Bayer 
subsequently took the case to the High Court,59 and then to the Indian Supreme Court,60 but 
lost, as the courts interpreted the provisions of its IP regime as being consistent with human 
rights norms. The question is whether the judiciary in African countries will be similarly 
resolute in interpreting patent law in a manner consistent with the reasonable requirements of 
                                                 
54  Natco Pharma Ltd v Bayer Corp, CLA 1 of 2011, 9 March 2012 (Indian Controller of Patents).  
55  ‘Sorafenib Tosyalte’ is a pharmaceutical therapeutic compound patented by the Bayer Corporation, marketed 
as Nexavar, and used in the treatment of the advanced stages of kidney cancer (Renal Cell Carcinoma) and 
liver cancer (Hepatocellular carcinoma). It stops the growth of new blood vessels and impacts other cellular 
growth mechanisms. The drug can extend the life of a patient by between 6 months and 5 years. See 
American National Cancer Institute, ‘FDA Approval for Sorafenib Tosylate’ (13 November 2013) 
<www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/druginfo/fda-sorafenib-tosylate> accessed 28 June 2016. 
56  Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘Accessing ARVs: Untangling the Web of Price Reductions for Developing 
Countries’ (15th edn, Médecins Sans Frontières 2012) 11. See also United Nations Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC), ‘Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, including the Right to Development: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to 
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (31 March 2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/11/12, [20], citing Brazil, India, South Africa, and Thailand. 
 
57     Note that IPAB exercises appellate jurisdiction against the decisions of the Controller General of Patents, 
          Registrar under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and 
           Protection) Act, 1999. 
58  Bayer Corp v Union of India and Others, OA/35/2012/PT/MUM, IPAB, 4 March 2013 (Intellectual Property 
Appellate Board, Chennai, India). 
59  Bayer Corp v Union of India and Others, WP 1323 of 2013, 15 July 2014 (Bombay High Court (BHC)). 
60  Bayer Corp v Union of India and Others, SLP 30145 of 2014, 12 December 2014 (Indian Supreme Court 
(ISC)). 
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the public. Notably, recent activities by WIPO indicate that African judges lack the capacity to 
enforce IP standards and interpret the flexibilities.61  
Aventis v Cipla62 (South Africa) and Pfizer Inc v Cosmos Limited63 (Kenya) confirm this 
conclusion. As already reiterated, Africa has many needs with regard to institutional, technical 
and human resources-based aspects of capacity.64 More importantly, training and human 
resource development of various kinds, typically aimed at the development of professional 
capacities in IP administration and enforcement, has been a major focus in IP-related technical 
assistance programmes.65 Consequently, the traditional norm on which these capacity building 
initiatives sits follows the North-South model, despite the importance of the South-South model 
capable of meeting some of the fundamental development needs of developing countries.66 
The framework of operational guidelines on UN support for South-South and triangular 
cooperation defines South-South cooperation as: 
[A] process whereby two or more developing countries pursue their individual and/or shared 
national capacity development objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, resources 
and technical know-how, and through regional and interregional collective actions, including 
partnerships involving Governments, regional organisations, civil society, academia and the 
private sector, for their individual and/or mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South 
cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation.67 
                                                 
61  WIPO has recently, in March 2014, held a national colloquium on building respect for IP for the judiciary 
in Ghana. The Colloquium, which was attended by 18 High Court Judges and two Circuit Court Judges, had 
the purpose of examining the minimum standards and flexibilities contained in Part III of the TRIPS 
Agreement, discussing topical issues, including consumer awareness raising and the equitable disposal of 
infringing goods, addressing recent case law developments, and working towards effective inter-agency 
cooperation at the national level. For the programme of the colloquium see WIPO, ‘WIPO National 
Colloquium on Building Respect for IP for the Judiciary’ (27 March 2014) WIPO Doc 
WIPO/IP/ACC/14/INF/2. 
62  Cipla Medpro v Aventis Pharma (139/12); Aventis Pharma SA v Cipla Life Sciences (138/12) [2012] ZASCA 
108 (South African Supreme Court of Appeal (SASCA)). Decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, 26 July 
2012. 
63  Case No 49 of 2006, 25 April 2008 (Kenyan Industrial Property Tribunal). 
64  Thaddeus Manu, ‘Locally Working Patents and the Grant of Compulsory Licences: The Need for Stronger 
Statutory Provisions in Africa’ (2014) 3 Global Journal of Comparative Law 203, 234 (referring to the 
absence of institutional immaturity and competence issues). 
65  Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (n 7) 137. 
66  Developing countries can support each other through South-South cooperation to transfer, adapt, acquire, 
and pool knowledge and experience to achieve economic growth and poverty reduction. 
67  UNGA (High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation), ‘Note by the Secretary-General on the 
Framework of Operational Guidelines on United Nations support to South-South and Triangular 
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The definitions of South-South and triangular cooperation are based on the Nairobi 
Outcome Document, negotiated at the UN High-Level Conference on South-South 
Cooperation and adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 2009.68 Therefore, despite 
the idea of South-South cooperation having already influenced revolutionary thinking in the 
field of development, African countries often neglect this69 because of the resulting opportunity 
for lucrative market access with a more developed north.70 While this is both the norm and 
practice, evidence suggests that there exist inconsistent motivations in delivering capacity 
programmes, where on most occasions capacity building initiatives focus too much on 
ratcheting up stronger IP regimes to cement the export interests of developed countries.71 In 
the end, the failings in the system mean that the institutional change required to promote IPRs 
standard-setting that is capable of meeting the fundamental interests of this category of 
countries has not been attained rapidly.72 
It is on this basis that this paper attempts a critical exploration of judicial cooperation 
based on the South-South model with a view to underlining its doctrinal significance for 
African countries to build capacity in the interpretation of the safeguard provisions within 
TRIPS consistent with human rights norms in a health-sensitive way to promote access to 
medicines. Therefore, the author questions the rationality of Africa countries’ exclusive 
reliance on so-called North-South capacity building and argues that the South-South judicial 
cooperation model would provide a logical platform that could operate alongside the 
conventional North-South system for building institutional, technical, and human resource-
based aspects of capacity for its judiciary to interpret TRIPS in a manner consistent with human 
rights norms to promote access to medicines. 
                                                 
Cooperation’ (12 April 2012) UN Doc SSC/17/3 4 (providing an operational definition of South-South 
cooperation). 
68  UNGA Res 64/222 (21 December 2009) UN Doc A/RES/64/222 (Nairobi Outcome Document) annex, cls 
18–20.  
69  ibid. 
70  Manu (n 30) 48 cites the African Growth and Opportunity Act 2000 (US) and states that African countries 
do not hesitate to trade off stringent enforcement of IP in negotiating BTAs for market access. 
71  Drahos (n 24) 797. 
72  Deere Birkbeck and Roca (n 43) 2 (Box 2). 
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B IMPLICATIONS OF TRIPS AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Significantly, the relevant justification for IP protection follows economic paradigms. Not only 
have IP regimes become globalised, but the scope of the subject-matter has also been expanded 
exponentially. Therefore, the current IP policymaking under the ambiance of the WTO takes 
on board no human rights values. While TRIPS embodies certain public interest safeguards, 
none of its 73 articles specifically makes reference to human rights norms. 
As a matter of empirical logic, countries have historically developed their patent regimes 
in accordance with their own interests and levels of development.73 For instance, at the start of 
the Uruguay Round,74 about fifty member states did not grant protection to pharmaceutical 
products at all, and some also excluded pharmaceutical processes and products from 
protection.75 Thus, before TRIPS, countries had more freedom to design their national IPR 
regimes under the Paris Convention.76 They could exclude from protection entire fields of 
technology, determine the patent term, and define many other aspects of such regimes.  
The foremost restrictions on manufacturing and supply were not of a formal legal 
character, except for the prevailing conditions of legal uncertainty affecting technology 
transfer, which generally may have inhibited investment in, or the flow of, medicines benefiting 
                                                 
73  Carlos M Correa, ‘Intellectual Property Rights and Inequalities in Health Outcomes’ in Roland Labonté, Ted 
Schrecker, Corinne Parker, and Vivien Runnels (eds), Globalization and Health: Pathways, Evidence and 
Policy (Routledge 2009) 263, 264. 
74  The Uruguay Round was launched by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), ‘Ministerial 
Declaration’ (20 September 1986) GATT Doc Min(86)/W/19 (Punta del Este Declaration). See also Kendall 
Stiles, ‘Negotiating Institutional Reform: The Uruguay Round, the GATT, and the WTO’ (1996) 2 Global 
Governance, 119–48; Alan Winters, ‘The Road to Uruguay’ (1990) 100 The Economic Journal, 1288–1303. 
75  Some of the countries that did not grant pharmaceutical product patents include Portugal, Spain, Brazil, 
India, Mexico, and Egypt. See Juan C Ginarte and Walter G Park, ‘Determinants of patent rights: A cross-
national study’ (1997) 26 Research Policy 283. Before TRIPS, many countries provided only process, but 
not product, patents. Product patents provide for absolute protection of the product, whereas process patents 
provide protection in respect of the technology and the process or method of manufacture. Protection for 
process patents would not prevent the manufacture of patented products by a process of reverse engineering, 
where a different process or method from that which has been invented (and patented) is used. For example, 
national legislation requiring only process patent protection has enabled manufacturers in certain countries 
to make generic versions of patented medicines. See, Germán Velásquez and Pascale Boulet, ‘Globalization 
and access to drugs: perspectives on the WTO/TRIPS Agreement’ (Health Economics and Drugs Series No 
7, 2nd rev edn, WHO 1999) 19. 
76  Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (adopted 20 March 1883, last amended 28 
September 1979) 21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 305. 
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these countries. Rather, the key factors depended on the reverse engineering capacities.77 In 
this environment, the ability of developing countries to obtain essential medicines varied with 
respect to their procurement methods, local manufacturing capabilities, public health policies, 
and general financial resources.78  
This is no longer the case, as the adoption of TRIPS changed this dramatically.79 Backed 
by its strong enforcement mechanism, TRIPS appeared to put an end to the significant leeway 
that countries had in designing their national patent systems in line with their domestic socio-
economic conditions.80 Notably, TRIPS contains standards relating to patents and covers both 
substantive principles as well as specific issues of enforcement that are generally applicable to 
patents.81  
Thus, with the incorporation of the TRIPS Agreement as one of the multilateral 
agreements of the WTO, members are bound to observe a set of minimum standards of IPRs 
protection, 82 and failure to do so may lead to sanctions under the rules of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding system.83 The outcome of the negotiation of TRIPS in 1994 resulted in the 
                                                 
77  Frederick M Abbott and Jerome H Reichman, ‘The Doha Round’s Public Health Legacy: Strategies for the 
Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions’ (2007) 10 Journal 
of International Economic Law 921, 928. 
78  Peter Drahos, ‘Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Owners and Their 
Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid’ (2004) 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
53, 76; Cícero Gontijo, ‘Changing the Patent System from the Paris Convention to the TRIPS Agreement: 
The Position of Brazil’ (Andrea Carina Ceschi (tr), Global Issue Papers No 26, Heinrich Böll Foundation 
2005) 6 
<www.boell.de/sites/default/files/assets/boell.de/images/download_de/internationalepolitik/GIP26.pdf> 
accessed 26 November 2016. 
79  Carlos Correa and Duncan Matthews, ‘The Doha Declaration Ten Years on and Its Impact on Access to 
Medicines and the Right to Health’ (Discussion Paper, United Nations Development Programme, Bureau of 
Development Policy 2011) 5. 
80  Gail E Evans, ‘Strategic Patent Licensing for Public Research Organizations: Deploying Restriction and 
Reservation Clauses to Promote Medical R&D in Developing Countries’ (2008) 34 American Journal of 
Law & Medicine 175, 180. 
81  UNCTAD (n 6) [111–114]. 
82  Correa and Matthews (n 79) 6. 
83  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (adopted 15 April 1994 as 
Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement (n 19), entered into force 1 January 1995) 1869 UNTS 401, 33 ILM 1226 
(Dispute Settlement Understanding). For additional analysis of the WTO dispute resolution rules see Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: International Law, International 
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Agreement unambiguously strengthening the scope of patent rights, declaring in part, under its 
Article 27, that ‘patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, 
in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable 
of industrial application’.  
Moreover, Article 27(1) in part provided that patent rights would be ‘enjoyable without 
discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are 
imported or locally produced’.84 The controversial interpretation is that the foregoing provision 
completely prohibits WTO members from mandating within their national patent regimes the 
reasonable requirements of the public concerning the general principles applicable to the 
working of patented inventions locally as an independent condition for the granting of 
compulsory licences.85  
Admittedly, while there are many factors that may contribute to the problem of limited 
access to essential medicines,86 patents on pharmaceutical products are often blamed for the 
lack of access to medicines.87 Importantly, there is another school of thought that generally 
agrees that patents on pharmaceutical medicines provide a very strong incentive for research.88 
Remarkably, African countries, that are mostly LDCs, have a special dispensation not to 
enforce patents on pharmaceutical products until 2033.89 Still, they in a way enforce 
pharmaceutical patents via the legal conduits of BTAs90 while the pharmaceutical industry has 
                                                 
Organizations and Dispute Settlement (Kluwer International Law 1997) 117 (discussing the new dispute 
settlement system of the 1994 WTO Agreement). 
84  ibid. 
85  Maria Victoria Stout, ‘Crossing the TRIPS Nondiscrimination Line: How CAFTA Pharmaceutical Patent 
Provisions Violate TRIPS Article 27.1’ (2008) 14 Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law 
177, 180. 
86  Ellen ‘t Hoen, ‘TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from 
Seattle to Doha’ (2002) 3 Chicago Journal of International Law 27, 28. 
87  Amir Attaran, ‘How Do Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential Medicines in Developing 
Countries?’ (2004) 23 Health Affairs 155, 159.  
88  Henry Grabowski, ‘Patents, Innovation and Access to New Pharmaceuticals’ (2002) 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law 849, 850. 
89  WTO (Council for TRIPS) (n 37). 
90  Okediji (n 27). 
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failed to innovate medicines that can be used to treat tropical diseases, often citing commercial 
reasons.91 
In fact, critics point to high prices resulting from patent protection as the reason why 
essential medicines are less affordable for people in developing countries.92 Thus, by 
preventing cheap generic copies of essential medicines under patent from being produced and 
distributed, the TRIPS Agreement has had serious ramifications for public health.93 
Importantly, while access to affordable essential medicines could be achieved through a variety 
of different mechanisms, the use of compulsory licensing remains the foremost feasible means 
to promote access to affordable medicines.94 
C COMPULSORY LICENSING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY TO REALISE ACCESS 
TO MEDICINES 
The adoption of the TRIPS Agreement standards resulted in the creation of diverse options for 
WTO members to implement their TRIPS obligations, while taking into account different 
considerations such as the country’s stage of development and specific national interests (e.g. 
public health).95 This is significant, as the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement recognises the 
underlying public policy objectives of national systems for the protection IP. Thus, the TRIPS 
Agreement incorporated compulsory licensing as one of the flexibilities that members may use 
to such an extent as their national regimes make provision for its use.  
                                                 
91  Thaddeus Manu, ‘Exploring a Regional Pharmaceutical Innovation Network as a Possible Solution to the 
Market Failure in the Innovation of Essential Medicines for Tropical Diseases in sub-Saharan Africa’ (2014) 
6 African Journal of Science, Technology, Innovation and Development 111, 117. 
92  UNHRC (n 56) [19]; Philippe Cullet, ‘Patents and medicines: the relationship between TRIPS and the human 
right to health’ (2003) 79 International Affairs 139, 160.  
93  WHO, Progress on Global Access to HIV Antiretroviral Therapy: A Report on “3 by 5” and Beyond (World 
Health Organisation 2006) 60.  
94  Robert Weissman, ‘A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global 
Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World 
Countries’ (1996) 17 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Economic Law 1069, 1124. 
95  WHO, WIPO, and WTO, Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation: Intersections Between 
Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade (WHO, WIPO, and WTO 2013) 71 
<www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/pamtiwhowipowtoweb13_e.pdf> accessed 22 July 2016. 
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The compulsory licensing regime finds its legal basis in Article 31 of TRIPS. The general 
purpose of that provision is to allow any WTO member state to grant a compulsory licence.96 
Put differently, Article 31 of TRIPS essentially provides for a distinct balancing act, 
establishing a government’s right to issue compulsory licences, while attempting to safeguard 
the rights of the patent-holder whenever possible.97 Remarkably, the Paris Convention can be 
a good starting point for outlining the legal provisions that frame any discussion of the legality 
of compulsory licensing as an instrument of government policy.  
As a matter of discretion reserved for the member states, the Paris Convention does not 
pursue any substantive grounds on which to grant such licences.98 Moreover, it is a matter of 
legal prudence that Article 5(A)(2) of the Paris Convention recognises one example whereby 
members may grant compulsory licences, that is, to remedy failure to work, which the 
Convention contemplates as an abuse of the exclusive rights. In fact, the restrictions are based 
on substantive conditions only.  
With this requirement, members may not grant any licences before the expiration of a 
period of four years from the date of the filing of the patent application or three years from the 
date of the granting of the patent, whichever period expires last.99 Complementing the language 
in Article 5(A) of the Paris Convention, which is directly incorporated into TRIPS by virtue of 
Article 2, the TRIPS Agreement does not use the term ‘compulsory licensing’. However, in 
reference to patent usage, Article 31 does allow for ‘use without authorisation of the right 
holder’, thus allowing a compulsory licence to be issued.100  
                                                 
96  Richard Hunter, ‘Compulsory Licensing: A Major Issue in International Business Today?’ (2009) 11 
European Journal of Social Sciences 370, 372. 
97  Sara M Ford, ‘Compulsory Licensing Provisions under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing Pills and Patents’ 
(1999-2000) 15 American University International Law Review 941, 960. 
98  Georg Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property as Revised at Stockholm in 1967 (WIPO Publication No 611(E), United International Bureaux for 
the Protection of Intellectual Property (BIRPI) 1969) 70. 
99  Paris Convention (n 76) art 5(A)(4). 
100  Letter from the Consumer Project on Technology to the Congressional Black Caucus regarding the 
African/AIDS/Patent Trade Dispute (29 June 1999) <www.cptech.org/ip/health/sa/clyburn.html> accessed 
25 July 2016; Michael Blakeney, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property: A Concise Guide to the 
TRIPS Agreement (Sweet & Maxwell 1996) 90. 
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Along the same legal premise as the Paris Convention, Article 31 of TRIPS does not state 
specifically the grounds upon which compulsory licences can be issued. In fact, with the single 
exception of semiconductor technology, Article 31 of TRIPS does not limit the grounds on 
which WTO members can implement compulsory licences. This is also qualified by the same 
understanding that as far as their domestic laws allow them, members can pursue compulsory 
licences, and thus have the freedom to determine the grounds on which such licences are 
based.101 
However, although some grounds are expressly mentioned in Article 31 of TRIPS, these 
are only examples that are meant to guide members. Article 31 of TRIPS, thus, describes two 
situations where compulsory licences can be used. Nevertheless, these two situations—where 
the licence is required to address an overriding public interest, and where the patent rights are 
being used in an anticompetitive manner—remain within the remit of the national laws of 
member states. TRIPS does not limit the possibility of, or WTO members’ independence in, 
granting compulsory licences on any other substantive grounds.102  
Article 31 of TRIPS contains a detailed set of substantive conditions and procedural 
requirements that must be satisfied when members are to grant compulsory licences. Therefore, 
in as much as the procedural requirements and other substantive conditions are met, the TRIPS 
Agreement does not limit members’ possibility to grant compulsory licences on any grounds, 
such as failure to work or public health considerations, and leaves open cases in which such 
licences can be granted.103 This is confirmed by the Doha Declaration.104  
In this spirit, the TRIPS Agreement also allows member states to make virtually all 
decisions regarding the granting of compulsory licences, including those regarding 
compensation or appeals, through administrative processes, provided that the process is fair 
and transparent.105 Therefore, WTO members are left with a very broad scope of action with 
                                                 
101  Daniel Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement: Drafting Analysis and Negotiating History (1st edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 1998) 165. 
102  Correa (n 2) 311. 
103  Frederick M Abbott, Thomas Cottier, and Francis Gurry, International Intellectual Property Integrated 
World Economy (2nd edn, Aspen Publishers 2011) 196. 
104  Doha Declaration (n 20) cl 5(b). 
105  TRIPS (n 1) art 31(c), (i), (j), and (k). 
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regard to the grounds on which they can grant compulsory licences.106 These include the need 
to authorise such use on its individual merit,107 non-exclusivity,108 the need for a prior request 
to the patent holder on reasonable commercial terms, and the obligation to pay adequate 
compensation.109 
The requirement to request a voluntary licence is not applicable in cases of emergency 
and public non-commercial use.110 It is also important to note that TRIPS specifically does not 
require governments to grant injunctive relief to patent holders111 in cases where government 
authorisations of patent use satisfy the Article 31 framework.112 Article 31, therefore, makes it 
obvious that the TRIPS Agreement leaves members with a wide discretion as to the granting 
of compulsory licences and the grounds on which to do so. In other words, the restrictions are 
not strictly legal in nature, but member states must satisfy certain substantive conditions in 
relation to the application of the procedural requirements.113 
Compulsory licensing as an instrument of government policy is not new to the patent 
system. This instrument has formed a common and integrated part of most patent systems,114 
even though it is not often put into practice for various reasons, including human resource 
constraints, political considerations, inadequate infrastructure, and high operating costs due to 
small market size, which makes the practice of compulsory licensing difficult in developing 
countries.115 In other words, the concept and practice of compulsory licences are not new, even 
                                                 
106  Velásquez and Boulet (n 75) 35. 
107  TRIPS (n 1) art 31(a). 
108  TRIPS (n 1) art 31(d). 
109  TRIPS (n 1) art 31(h). 
110  TRIPS (n 1) art 31(b). 
111  TRIPS (n 1) art 44(2). 
112  James Love, Compulsory Licensing: Models for State Practice in Developing Countries, Access to Medicine 
and Compliance with the WTO TRIPS Accord (Third World Network 2004) 1. 
113  Thaddeus Manu, ‘Building National Initiatives of Compulsory Licences: Reflecting on the Indian 
Jurisprudence as a Model for Developing Countries’ (2015) 14 Journal of International Trade Law & Policy 
23, 35. 
114  Compulsory licensing provisions were included, eg, in the first patents statute of Australia, the Patents Act 
1903 (Cth) (Australia) s 87.  
115  Warren A Kaplan, Local Production and Access to Medicines in Low- and Middle-Income Countries: A 
literature review and critical analysis (prepared for the WHO Department of Public Health, Innovation and 
Intellectual Property, World Health Organisation 2011) 3. 
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in developed countries.116 They have a long history and have remained a prominent feature of 
the general philosophy of patent regimes for over a century. Many patent law regimes provide 
for the granting of compulsory licences in a variety of situations.117 Many countries have used, 
or threatened to use, compulsory licensing for public interest purposes. Specific situations in 
which compulsory licences may be issued are set out in the relevant statutes of each patent 
system.118  
D JUSTIFICATION OF ACCESS TO MEDICINES ON THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RIGHT TO 
HEALTH 
International human rights standards have transformed the nature of the relationship between 
governments and individuals and made public authorities far more accountable. For instance, 
the right to health is also recognised in numerous regional and international human rights 
instruments and declarations as a fundamental human right and is a core obligation that states 
are obliged to fulfil.119 Examples in this regard are the United Nations Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,120 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,121 the Convention on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women,122 the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,123 the International Covenant on Economic, 
                                                 
116  The Belgian Patent Law (28 March 1984, last amended 28 January 1997), arts 31, 33, and 35, eg concern 
compulsory licences. See also Friedrich-Karl Beier, ‘Exclusive Rights, Statutory Licenses and Compulsory 
Licenses in Patent and Utility Model Law’ (1999) 30 International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Copyright Law 251, 259–260. 
117  Cole Fauver, ‘Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come’ (1987) 
8 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 666, 671. 
118  UNCTAD and the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), Resource Book on 
TRIPS and Development: An Authoritative and Practical Guide to the TRIPS Agreement (CUP 2005) ch 25. 
119  United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘General Comment No. 3: 
The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant)’ (14 December 1990) UN Doc 
E/1991/23 [2]; CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health 
(Art. 12 of the Covenant)’ (11 August 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4 [36]. See also John Tobin, The Right 
to Health in International Law (OUP 2012) 194. 
120  UNDHR (n 11) art 25. 
121  Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 
1577 UNTS 3 (CRC) art 24. 
122  Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into 
force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNS 13 (CEDAW) arts 11(1)(f), 12.  
123  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 
1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (ICERD) art 5(e). 
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Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),124 and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.125  
The preamble to the constitution of the World Health Organisation (WHO) also declares 
that it is one of the fundamental rights of every human being to enjoy ‘the highest attainable 
standard of health.’126 The ICESCR is the most important international instrument relating to 
socio-economic rights. Article 12 of ICESCR provides for the ‘enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health conducive to living a life of dignity’. This 
provision has been interpreted to include access to essential medicines.127 
Essential medicines, according to the WHO, are those that ‘satisfy the priority health care 
needs of the population’ and ‘are intended to be available within the context of functioning 
health systems at all times in adequate amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, with assured 
quality, and at a price the individual and the community can afford’.128 The UN Development 
Group defines ‘access’ in this context as ‘having medicines continuously available and 
affordable at public or private health facilities or medicine outlets that are within one hour’s 
walk from the homes of the population’.129 The normative view is that access to health care, 
including access to essential medicines, is a prerequisite for realising that right.130 Thus, a 
central principle underpinning the framework of access to medicines as a human rights matter 
has been interpreted broadly as including a right to treatment and, more specifically, a right to 
access to medicines.131  
                                                 
124  ICESCR (n 11) art 12. 
125  Banjul Charter (n 11) art 16. 
126   Constitution of the World Health Organisation [1946] 14 UNTS 185. UN General Assembly Resolution 
 A/RES/131, seconds-session, hundred and seventeenth plenary meeting, 17 November 1947. 
127  CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14’ (n 119) [12(a)], [12(b)]; Linda Muswaka, ‘The Impact of Patent 
Protection and Lack of Generic Competition on the Right of Access to Medicines in South Africa: 
Explicating Corporate Responsibilities for Human Rights’ (2014) 5 Mediterranean Journal of Social 
Sciences 229, 230. 
128  WHO, ‘Essential Medicines and Health Products’ (2016) 
<www.who.int/medicines/services/essmedicines_def/en/> accessed 1 July 2016. 
129  MDG Gap Task Force, Millennium Development Goal 8: Delivering on the Global Partnership for 
Achieving the Millennium Development Goals: MDG Gap Task Force Report 2008, (United Nations 2008) 
35. 
130  ibid 42. 
131  CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14’ (n 119) [12]; UNHRC Res 12/24 (2 October 2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/12/24, cl 7. 
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The concept of access to essential medicines as a human right is generally not a disputed 
notion in the academic literature.132 Theoretically, the mainstream international human rights 
instruments support its practical underpinnings.133 In fact, several resolutions and declarations 
at the international level, including those under the UN and its constituent agencies, have 
placed adequate scope on access to medicines as a significant component of the right to 
health.134 The domains of this norm have been transposed into some regional instruments and 
national legal provisions.135 The background to making access to medicines a shared norm 
backed by law at the international level follows a useful framework underpinning the basic 
principles of the overriding objective of public health protection.136 
While its underlying rationale is straightforward in theory in the empirical literature, its 
realisation has not gained any serious momentum at the national level, in particular in 
developing countries, which predominantly shoulder a disproportionate burden of diseases.137 
The spread of diseases continues to challenge the authority of political establishments in this 
category of countries, and although many of these diseases could easily be prevented if 
essential medicines were readily available within the public health setting, this is not the 
case.138 
The Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution in 2001 in which it recognised 
that ‘access to medication in the context of pandemics such as HIV/AIDS is one fundamental 
element for achieving progressively the full realization of the right of everyone to the 
                                                 
132  Thomas Pogge, ‘Montréal Statement on the Human Right to Essential Medicines’ (2007) 16 Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 97–108. 
133  UDHR (n 11); ICESCR (n 11); Banjul Charter (n 11). 
134  UNGA Res S-26/2 (27 June 2001) UN Doc A/RES/S-26/2, annex. 
135  Constitution of Azerbaijan, art 41; Constitution of Cameroon, art 25; Constitution of Cuba, art 50. See also 
S Katrina Perehudof, ‘Health, Essential Medicines, Human Rights & National Constitutions’ (World Health 
Organisation 2008) 61. 
136  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited Case [1970] ICJ Rep 32 [33], [34] found that ‘all 
States can be held to have a legal interest’ in the protection of obligations to the international community as 
a whole in view of the ‘importance of the rights involved’. See also Centre on Global Health Security 
Working Group on Health Financing, Shared Responsibilities for Health: A Coherent Global Framework 
for Health Financing (Final Report, The Royal Institute of International Affairs 2014) 7. 
137  World Health Assembly (WHA) Res 67.22 (24 May 2014) WHO Doc A67/VR/9, 2. 
138  Manu (n 64) 234. 
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enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’.139 Among a list of 
measures, it called on states ‘to refrain from taking measures which would deny or limit equal 
access for all persons to preventive, curative or palliative pharmaceuticals or medical 
technologies used to treat pandemics such as HIV/AIDS or the most common opportunistic 
infections that accompany them’140 and, clearly with TRIPS in mind, requested them 
[T]o ensure that their actions as members of international organisations take due account of the 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental 
health and that the application of international agreements is supportive of public health 
policies which promote broad access to safe, effective and affordable preventive, curative or 
palliative pharmaceuticals and medical technologies.141  
In 2001, the Office of the High Commissioner prepared a report on the impact of the 
TRIPS Agreement on human rights,142 and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights took this up in its resolution in the same year on ‘Intellectual 
Property Rights and Human Rights’.143 The resolution, adopted by consensus, referred to the 
‘actual or potential conflict… between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the 
realisation of economic, social and cultural rights’.144 In other words, access to medicines in 
the context of the human rights framework means that governments have a legal obligation to 
adopt reasonable measures to obtain access to affordable essential medicines for public health 
protection.  
A human rights orientation is predicated on the centrality of protecting and nurturing 
human dignity and the common good. By extension, the rights of the creator or the author are 
conditional on contributing to the common good and welfare of the society and not 
undermining the latter.145 A human rights approach also takes the implicit balance between the 
rights of inventors and creators and the interests of the wider society within IP paradigms and 
                                                 
139  UNCHR Res 33 (2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/ RES/2001/33, cl 1. 
140  ibid cl 3(a). 
141  ibid cl 4(b). 
142  UNCHR (Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights), ‘Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on 
human rights: Report of the High Commissioner’ (27 June 2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13.  
143  UNCHR (Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights) Res 21 (2001) UN Doc 
E/CN.4/SUB.2/RES/2001/21. 
144  ibid Preamble. 
145  Chapman (n 21) 14. 
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makes it far more explicit and exacting.146 As already mentioned, a human rights approach 
further establishes a requirement for the state to protect its citizens from the negative effects of 
IP regimes.147 
E APPLICATION AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS TO PROMOTE 
ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
The relationship between the protection of IP and human rights norms has been examined in a 
growing body of literature, most of which focuses on the substantive overlaps, interfaces, and 
tension between the two areas of law.148 Several landmark decisions by the judiciaries in 
different countries have raised popular awareness of the conflict between IP regimes and 
human rights norms. Although scholars have advanced theses suggesting that human rights 
trump IP protection, there still exist challenges inherent in the analysis of the intricate 
correlation between these two fields of law.149  
In fact, the conflict is complicated by the fact that the right to IP exists within the human 
rights frameworks.150 The complex interface between these strands of treaties is an area that 
deserves our renewed attention, given that we have not seen many of these judicial 
interventions in Africa. To start with, on 1 February 2011, in its decision in Novartis Pharma 
AG v Monte Verde SA,151 the Federal Court of Appeals in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Division III, an Argentinean court, rejected a heightened IP standard, in part with reference to 
human rights.  
In this litigation, Novartis argued that Argentina must afford the company data 
exclusivity in order to fulfil its TRIPS obligations. In rejecting that argument, the court stated 
that ‘one cannot ignore that developing countries imitate medical products through reverse 
                                                 
146  ibid. 
147  ibid 15. 
148  Laurence R Helfer, ‘Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?’ (2003) 5 Minnesota 
Intellectual Property Review 47, 48. 
149  Peter K Yu, ‘Intellectual Property and Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era’ (2011) 64 Florida Law 
Review 1045, 1047. 
150  Megan M Carpenter, ‘Intellectual property: A human (not corporate) right’ in David Keane and Yvonne 
McDermott (eds), The Challenge of Human Rights: Past, Present and Future (Edward Elgar 2012) 314. 
151  Novartis Pharma AG c/ Monte Verde SA s/ varios propiedad industrial e intellectual CFed, Causa No 
5.619/05, 1 February 2011 (Argentinian Federal Appeals Court). 
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engineering in order to cover the public health necessities; nor that the right to health—
internationally recognised in treaties that carry constitutional weight—is rigorously tied to the 
right to life, without which the rest of the guarantees of the Constitution lose their purpose’.152 
The court also noted that ‘the reasonability of an impugned legal regime is better understood 
when one reads it in light of international human rights obligations’.153 Thus, the Argentinian 
court used human rights obligations to explain why the proposed IP standard was 
impermissible.154 
Secondly, in August 2011, the Superior Court of Justice of Brazil reversed a Federal court 
decision, which had found that ANVISA had violated Article 39(3) of TRIPS in granting 
registration to an unauthorised third party if they used the test results and data of the dossier 
sent by Lundbeck Brazil Ltda, the producer of Lexapro, a reference drug, to receive the 
registration for the drug.155 The Supreme Court reasoned that its decision to reverse the Federal 
Court’s decision was ‘subject to the existence of a manifest public interest in order to avoid 
harm to public order, security, health or economy’.156 The Superior Court of Justice’s decision 
was squarely within the Brazilian national public policy, enshrined in Law 9.787 of 1999, 
which provides the legal framework for access to generic medicines.157 
Finally, on 29 February 2012, the Supreme Administrative Court of Colombia, Civil 
Circuit Court 37 of Bogota, ruled that Abbott must respect Colombian price controls on its HIV 
medication Kaletra.158 The lawsuit, filed by Colombian health organisations in September 
                                                 
152  Thomas Dreier and Marco Ganzhorn, ‘Intellectual property in decisions of national Constitutional Courts in 
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2009, was a ‘Popular Action’, a mechanism under Article 88 of the 1991 Colombian Political 
Constitution (as amended) to protect collective rights, public safety and health, administrative 
morality, and other interests of a similar nature. This provision regulates actions arising out of 
harm caused to a large number of individuals.159 
Critically, the Supreme Court’s decision recognised that the right to health holds 
implications not only for the government’s system of distributing medications, but also for its 
manner of acquiring and paying for medications.160 The court explained how the right to health 
necessarily touches on any law that affects the accessibility of medications: ‘One must take 
into account that the right to health has a compensatory character, and for this compensatory 
character to be effective, the right to health requires that budgetary and procedural aspects be 
made viable and balanced’.161 
F THE COMPLEX INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES FROM THE AFRICAN COURTS PERSPECTIVE 
1 Aventis Pharma SA and Others v Cipla Life Sciences and Others 
In 2012, the Supreme Court of Appeal in South Africa handed down a contentious decision in 
the matter between Aventis Pharma SA and Others v Cipla Life Sciences and Others,162 with 
the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) intervening as amicus curiae pursuant to 
‘Docetaxel’.163 While essentially a dispute as to whether a holder of a pharmaceutical patent 
can obtain an interdict against an alleged infringer, this was a significant test case for the extent 
to which courts are required to apply broad constitutional principles (in this instance, the right 
of access to health care services and medicines) in IP disputes.164 The principle that the public 
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Page 27 of 53 Manu — Interpretation of TRIPS 19 November 2016 
 
 
interest applies in IP disputes had already been established in a previous unsuccessful 
application for a compulsory licence.165 
The disputed patent in the ‘Docetaxel’ case related to a composition of unpatented 
products, which, when combined, facilitate the intravenous administration of docetaxel, a 
treatment for cancer.166 The holder of the patent (Aventis Pharma SA) maintained that the 
generic manufacturer (Cipla Life Sciences) had infringed its patent by registering and 
commencing the manufacture and marketing of a cheaper version of the medicine.167 Cipla 
countered that the patent is invalid on account of ambiguity and lack of novelty and inventive 
step, essential requirements for patentability under South African law.168 A key complication 
is the fact that the South African patents office does not conduct substantive examinations as 
to the merits of each patent application, nor is there any opportunity for an interested party to 
oppose such applications. Thus, these court proceedings presented the first opportunity for any 
tribunal to consider the substantive merits of the docetaxel patent. 
In its heads of argument, the TAC submitted that the Patents Act169 must be construed 
‘through the prism of the Constitution’ and in a way that appropriately balances the rights of a 
patentee against the constitutional rights of others, and that it ‘must be interpreted and applied 
to ensure the public interest in patent protection is in fact served and ensuring other rights are 
not unreasonably limited thereby’.170 Section 39(2) of the South African Constitution indeed 
calls upon a court to ‘promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’ when 
interpreting legislation. Thus, the TAC argued that the rights of the patent holder need to be 
balanced with those of persons requiring, but unable to afford, the relevant medication.171  
                                                 
165  Syntheta (Pty) Ltd previously Delta G Scientific (Pty) Ltd v Janssen Pharmaceutica NV and Another (449/96) 
[1998] ZASCA 74 (ZASCA).  
166  Aventis (n 62) [3], [10]–[12]. 
167  ibid [3]. 
168  Patents Act, 57 of 1978 (South Africa) s 25(1), (6), (10) (South Africa). See also Ensign-Bickford (South 
Africa) (Pty) Ltd v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd (4/95) [1998] ZASCA 8 (ZASCA). 
169  Patent Act, 57 of 1978 (South Africa). 
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171  Yousuf A Vawda, ‘Patent Law in emerging economies: South Africa’ in Frederick M Abbott, Carlos M 
Correa and Peter Drahos (eds), Emerging Markets and the World Patent Order (Edward Elgar 2013) 291f. 
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Note that section 27(1)(a) of the South African Constitution provides for the right to have 
access to health care services. Universal access to health care services in that sense includes 
access to medications.172 In the case of Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd,173 access 
to medications was qualified by the court to mean access to affordable medications.174 
Secondly, when considering the requirement of ‘balance of convenience’ in interdict 
proceedings which potentially threaten the right to access medicines, the party requesting the 
interdict must prove that its grant will not harm the public interest.175 Thirdly, while the 
evidence to enable the court to assess whether the rights of cancer patients would be prejudiced 
is inadequate, on the basis of the available information on the record, the interdict-seeker failed 
to discharge its onus of proof.176 And finally, the TAC argued that, in line with courts in the 
USA, the court must assess whether a satisfactory alternative remedy (such as damages) is 
available to the party seeking an interdict.177 
In its judgment, the Court accepted TAC’s argument that the broader public interest, and 
not merely those of the litigating parties, ought to be considered when determining the balance 
of convenience in interdict proceedings, citing US Supreme Court case law.178 However, it 
concluded that the public interest would not be served by denying an interdict on the facts of 
this case, citing eBay Inc v Mercexchange LLC.179 
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177  ibid fn 35. See also Emmanuel Kolawale Oke, ‘Patent Rights, Access to Medicines, and Justiciability of the 
Right to Health in Kenya, South Africa and India’ in Alice Diver and Jacinta Miller (eds), Justiciability of 
Human Rights Law in Domestic Jurisdictions (Springer 2016) 91, 114. 
178  Aventis (n 62) [55] citing Innogenetics, NV v Abbott Laboratories 578 F Supp 2d 1079, 1105 (WD Wis 2007) 
(United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin), Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc v WL 
Gore & Assocs. Inc. No 03-CV-0597 (United States District Court for Arizona, 24 August 2010); Johnson 
& Johnson Vision Care, Inc v Ciba Vision Corporation 712 F Supp 2d 1285 (MD Fla 2010) (United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida). 
179  547 US 388 (2006). 
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The court noted that Cipla’s opposition was based on commercial considerations, namely 
its need to establish a presence in the generics market.180 Furthermore, it noted that there was 
no evidence before it that Aventis could not continue to meet the demand for the medicine, nor 
was Cipla able to demonstrate that its product offered either superior medicinal benefits or 
more than a marginal saving on the cost of its generic version of docetaxel in relation to 
Aventis’s generic version (marketed as Docetere).181 And finally, it held that there would be 
no material disruption of medicine supply to patients should the interdict be granted.182 While 
the court made a concession to the consideration of the public interest when determining the 
balance of convenience, its judgment was not unexpected given the constraints imposed by the 
legislation and the mind-set of the judiciary.183 
This decision once again highlights the need for amending the South African patent laws 
to specify and properly apply the strict standards of novelty and inventive step required for the 
granting of a patent, and to prioritise the public interest in disputes concerning life-saving 
medicines.184 The decision also highlights the power of patent right holders to frustrate generic 
competition,185 and hence access to cheaper medicines, by introducing their own generic 
versions when such a threat is imminent.  
Importantly, the South African government responded to the ruling and, in 2013, the 
Department of Trade and Industry of the Republic of South Africa released a Draft National 
Policy on Intellectual Property of South Africa.186 This policy framework was gazetted in the 
Government Gazette, 4 September 2013.187 This document deals with many aspects of IP, 
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including public health matters and recommendations in relation to the possibility of public 
policy intervention that will protect people’s health needs.188  
2 Kenya—a controversial patent decision: Pfizer Inc v Cosmos Limited 
While a court in Kenya struck down an ‘anti-counterfeiting’ law as a violation of the right to 
health in the Kenyan constitution,189 in 2008 the Kenyan Industrial Property Tribunal made a 
terrible declaration on the relationship between the right to health and IP rights in a dispute 
between a foreign multinational pharmaceutical company and a local pharmaceutical company 
in Kenya.190 
This followed an allegation under section 106 of the Kenyan Industrial Property Act 2001 
by Pfizer that Cosmos had infringed its patent on a medicinal product known as ‘azithromycin 
dihydrate’ under the trademark ‘Zithrox’.191 Cosmos, however, contended that the patent was 
not in force between 2003 and 2006 (when the alleged infringement occurred) due to the failure 
of Pfizer to pay the renewal fees on the patent.192 The tribunal, however, held that there was no 
evidence that the patent had lapsed or that it had been removed from the patent register at any 
time.193 
The patent in question was registered by the African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organisation (ARIPO), of which Kenya is a member, and Kenya was among the designated 
states for the patent. Section 81(3) of the Kenyan Industrial Property Act 2001 provides that ‘a 
patent, in respect of which Kenya is a designated state, granted by ARIPO by virtue of the 
ARIPO Protocol shall have the same effect in Kenya as a patent granted under this Act’.194 
                                                 
188  South African Department for Trade and Industry (n 186) ch 2. For further analysis see Carolyn Ncube, ‘The 
Draft National Intellectual Property Policy Proposals for Improving South Africa’s Patent Registration 
System: A Review’ (2014) 9 Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 10, 830–834. 
189  Patricia Asero Ochieng and Others v Attorney General, Petition No 409 of 209, 20 April 2012 (Kenyan 
High Court (KHC)). 
190  Pfizer (n 63). 
191  Pfizer’s ARIPO Patent No AP44. 
192  Oke (n 177) 113. 
193  Pfizer (n 63) 7. 
194  Emmanuel Kolawole Oke, ‘Incorporating a Right to Health Perspective into the Resolution of Patent Law 
Disputes’ (2013) 15 Health and Human Rights 97, 101. 
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The default mechanism is that failure to pay the maintenance fee of a granted patent on 
time renders the patented invention duly vacated or abandoned.195 In fact, the ARIPO’s 
Regulations for Implementing the Harare Protocol196 are explicitly clear on this. Rule 21(4) 
dubbed ‘Payment of Annual Maintenance Fees’ provides that: ‘If an annual maintenance fee is 
not paid in accordance with this Rule, the application shall be deemed to have been withdrawn 
or the patent shall lapse’. Reinstatement is possible,197 but only when the evidence logically 
supports an unintentional delay.198 Within this logic, the respondent contended that the patent 
had expired due to non-payment or late payment of renewal fees and relied on the case 
of Sanitam Services (EA) Ltd v Rentokil (K) Ltd and Another.199  
Cosmos raised an alternative defence that it was entitled to import, manufacture, sell, and 
export the patented product without the authority of Pfizer by virtue of section 58(2) of 
the Industrial Property Act, which allows parallel importation.200 Section 58(2) provides that 
‘the rights under the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of articles which have been put 
on the market in Kenya or in any other country or imported into Kenya’. Cosmos presented 
evidence to the tribunal establishing that the medicines containing the patented product were 
available in Kenya, having been imported from India, Bangladesh and China.201 
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In other words, the patent rights of Pfizer, with respect to those products which were 
readily available in Kenya had been exhausted.202 Cosmos was trying to rely on the principle 
of international exhaustion of patent rights as reflected in section 58(2), and though this 
principle might not give Cosmos the right to manufacture the patented product, it would entitle 
Cosmos to import those patented products from India, Bangladesh, and China and to resell 
them in Kenya.203 
However, in a rather curious and confusing manner, the tribunal conflated parallel 
importation with compulsory licences and voluntary licences. According to the tribunal,  
parallel importation… is applicable for instance where the government has allowed a third 
party to exploit the patent, and that party imports the product from other countries where it is 
legitimately put on the market… This could also be with the authority of the patent holder by 
way of a contractual or voluntary license.204  
The tribunal could not envision a situation where a third party could engage in the parallel 
importation of a patented product without the authorisation of the patentee or the government 
and its definition of parallel importation clearly contradicts what is contained in section 
58(2).205 Section 58(2) does not require a person or a company to obtain government 
authorisation or a compulsory/voluntary licence before engaging in parallel importation.206 
Cosmos equally argued that the patented product was used for the treatment of 
opportunistic infections in HIV/AIDS patients and that the WHO listed the product as an 
essential medicine for the treatment of genital chlamydia trachomatis and trachoma.207 By 
raising this argument, Cosmos highlighted a tension between the enforcement of Pfizer’s patent 
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rights on the one hand and the need to facilitate access to this essential medicine for Kenyan 
patients on the other. 208   
The resolution of this tension therefore required a proper appreciation of the fact that 
patent rights are instrumental rights that should serve the needs and interests of fundamental 
rights such as access to affordable medicines. If the tension had been approached from this 
dimension, it would have enabled the tribunal to interpret the patent law with the objective of 
ensuring that it did not impede access to medicines.209 However, in this particular case, the 
Kenyan tribunal took the view that the product was not a first-line treatment for HIV/AIDS 
patients and that even if this were the case, it would not entitle the respondents to exploit the 
patent without authorisation.210  
The tribunal thus failed to appreciate the essential distinction between the instrumental 
nature of patent rights and the fundamental nature of access to essential medicines.211 It can be 
argued that the tribunal failed to appreciate this essential distinction because Article 43(1)(a), 
which made the right to health justiciable in Kenya, was introduced into the Kenyan 
Constitution only in 2010—two years after the tribunal’s judgment.  
As noted above, section 58(2) was introduced in order to facilitate the importation of 
medicines for the treatment of HIV/AIDS and opportunistic ailments. However, even without 
invoking the constitutional right to health, a court that is mindful of the fundamental importance 
of securing access to medicines would have examined the rationale behind the inclusion of 
Section 58(2) in the Kenyan patent law in accordance with the objective of ensuring that the 
enforcement of a patent right does not defeat the aims of the drafters of the patent law.212 
A classic example of a case where the court recognised this essential distinction, even in 
the absence of a constitutional right to health, is the English case of Roussel-Uclaf v GD Searle 
& Co Ltd (No 1)213 In that case, the claimants (who held a licence under a patent to exclusively 
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sell certain drugs) sought to restrain the defendants from selling one of those drugs in the United 
Kingdom (UK). However, the court refused to grant an injunction restraining the defendants 
from selling the drug because it was a unique, life-saving drug with no precise equivalent in 
the market, and the claimants were not yet selling the drug in the UK.  
Thus, the English court was clearly concerned about preserving access to this life-saving 
drug for patients in the UK.214 A court that is mindful of the fundamental importance of 
securing access to medicines will never permit the enforcement of patent rights in a manner 
that impedes access to medicines. In the Pfizer case, the approach adopted by the Kenyan 
tribunal essentially elevated the rights of patentees above the right to health of patients in need 
of essential medicines. The tribunal lost sight of the fundamental importance of securing access 
to essential medicines while it was adjudicating the patent dispute between the parties.215 
These cases are illustrations of a quiet revolution, but one that has far-reaching and 
unpredictable consequences for IP regimes, and which is now affecting the social structures of 
societies both at the world and national level and will affect them even more in future. In fact, 
these cases reinforce the notion that capacity building in the judicial arena in the interpretation 
of IP regimes consistent with public interests as underlined by human rights norms, even 
though significant for public health protection, is still lacking. 
G THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
It must be noted that when TRIPS entered into force in 1995, many developing countries 
already had significant IP laws and administrative systems in place, but had to revise their 
national regimes accordingly.216 But to implement the full set of TRIPS standards presented a 
significant challenge for most developing countries, as it involved substantial development of 
their laws and administrative systems. Developing countries were concerned, when 
implementing TRIPS standards, to ensure that their IP systems operated in a balanced and 
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effective way as a tool of public policy. Achieving this objective can call upon a wide array of 
technical, legal and policy expertise.217  
As already mentioned, an extended period was provided for developing and LDC 
members to implement TRIPS218 and facilitate this implementation, and developed countries 
agreed to provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, technical and 
financial cooperation in favour of developing and LDC members.219 This technical cooperation 
has continued through to the present, and these initiatives have sought to build sustainable 
capacity by concentrating on strengthening the policy and analytical skills within these 
countries.  
Therefore, based on Article 4 of the Agreement between WIPO and the WTO,220 the 
former would provide varying degrees of capacity building—predominantly relating to 
institutional, technical, and human resources-based aspects—to developing countries with 
regard to the TRIPS Agreement. In line with this obligation, the IP system, including its legal, 
institutional, and human resources aspects, should meet national policy objectives and should 
be effective, affordable, and easily accessible to all stakeholders.221 The policy objectives for 
WIPO’s technical assistance programmes are set out in the Medium Term Plan for WIPO 
Program Activities - Vision and Strategic Direction of WIPO.222  
The guiding principle of this plan is that every country should be encouraged to develop 
an IP culture appropriate to its needs, including a national IP strategy, the most suitable national 
infrastructure, and the fostering of a nationwide perception of IP as a powerful tool for 
economic, social, and cultural development.223 Governments are free to identity their capacity 
needs and request programmes from a wide range of areas including how to use the TRIPS 
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flexibilities in their countries. Importantly, the use of flexibilities is also addressed in a number 
of recommendations contained in WIPO’s DA.224  
According to WIPO’s policy framework for technical assistance, national IP systems in 
developing countries should maintain a balance between the interests of the holders of IPRs 
and those of the public at large.225 As the UN agency responsible for IP, WIPO’s overall 
objective is the promotion of effective protection and use of IPRs throughout the world through 
cooperation with, and among, its member states and other stakeholders within the framework 
of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).226 With the aim of building on the MDGs, 
which were agreed in 2000 at the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit, on 25 
September 2015 world leaders adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and 
this includes capacity building.227 
According to WIPO documentation, this objective is to be achieved by creating an 
enabling environment and infrastructure conducive to an enhanced understanding of the 
contribution of IP to economic, social, and cultural development,228 and, in particular, by 
assisting developing countries in building their capacity for greater access to, and use of, the 
IP system.229 This includes, for example, the provision of legislative advice to member states 
                                                 
224  Cluster B: 17 & 22. According to the WIPO CDIP Report, the term ‘flexibilities’ means that there are 
different options through which TRIPS obligations can be transposed into national law, so that national 
interests are accommodated and TRIPS provisions and principles are also complied with. This definition 
would effectively delimit the scope of the concept through the following elements: It highlights the idea of 
using various options as a means of implementation. It refers to the legislative process of implementation, 
reflecting the view that the first step needed in order to take advantage of a given flexibility consists of 
incorporating that flexibility into national law. It refers to the reason for flexibilities, which is to 
accommodate national interest. It reflects that a given flexibility needs to be compatible with the provisions 
and principles of the TRIPS Agreement: see, ‘Patent Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal 
Framework and their Legislative Implementation at the National and Regional Levels’ (Geneva, Committee 
on Development and Intellectual Property, fifth-session, CDIP/5/4, 1 March 2010) [34] 
<http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=131629> accessed 10 April 2017. 
225  ‘WIPO and WTO Agreement’ (n 34) [10(d)]. 
226  The MDGs were adopted by UNGA Res 55/2 (18 September 2000) UN Doc A/RES/55/2. See also WIPO 
(CDIP), ‘The Measurement of the Millennium Development Goals in other United Nations Agencies and 
the Contribution of WIPO to the MDGs’ (21 November 2013) WIPO Doc CDIP/12/8.  
227  Sustainable Development Goals (n 38). 
228  WIPO (CDIP), ‘WIPO and the Post-2015 Development Agenda’ (9 October 2015) WIPO Doc CDIP/16/8.  
229  FIVS, ‘WIPO Liaison Group’ (2010) <fivs.org/wm/committees/wipo.htm> accessed 1 July 2016; WIPO 
(CDIP), ‘Mapping of WIPO Activities Related to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
Implementation’ (25 February 2016) WIPO Doc CDIP/17/8. 
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in line with countries’ development needs and priorities, making use of the flexibilities 
available under the international IP system.230 
Following the request of the Committee on Development and Intellectual Property, 
WIPO prepared a preliminary study on patent related flexibilities in the multilateral legal 
framework and their legislative implementation at the national and regional levels.231 The study 
presents a non-exhaustive number of flexibilities in the patent area, accompanied by a 
conceptual development for each, as well as annexes and tables reflecting corresponding legal 
provisions and practices in a substantial number of countries. The report shows a diverse 
approach to the implementation of the TRIPS flexibilities in national laws.  
Specifically, it highlights the importance of compulsory licensing as an instrument of 
government policy to provide access to affordable medicines for public health protection. 
Notwithstanding this, African LDCs have not made better use of the key flexibility of not 
complying with the TRIPS Agreement at all except for Articles 3 and 4 of TRIPS, which 
formulate key principles such as national treatment and the most-favoured nation clause.232 An 
independent report has found critical shortcomings in the technical assistance activities under 
WIPO.233 
H THE DOCTRINE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ITS RELEVANCE TO CAPACITY 
BUILDING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
While the concept of international cooperation is not a recent norm, the need for it as an impetus 
for development is a recent innovation. A great deal of it takes place under bilateral 
agreements.234 The concept has received adequate consideration in the international relations 
scholarship, which delves much into its theoretical foundation. At the heart of many of the most 
                                                 
230  WIPO (CDIP) (n 17).  
231  ‘Patent Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework and their Legislative Implementation at the 
National and Regional Levels’ (n 224). 
232  Gail E Evans, ‘TRIPS and the Sufficiency of the Free Trade Principles’ (1999) 2 The Journal of World 
Intellectual Property 707, 714. 
233  Carolyn Deere Birkbeck and Santiago Roca (n 42) ii, 90, 92, 93. 
234  UNGA (High-level Committee on the Review of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries), 
‘Review of Progress made in Implementing the Buenos Aires Plan of Action and the Decisions of the High-
level Committee and Implementation of the Recommendations of the South Commission’ (7 April 1995) 
UN Doc TCDC/9/2 [20]. 
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significant theoretical debates lies the importance of international cooperation as a tool for 
building capacity. Significantly, Robert Keohane’s ‘After Hegemony’,235 Ernst Haas’ ‘Beyond 
the Nation-State’,236 and Thomas Franck’s ‘The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations’237 have 
all made contributions reinforcing the importance of cooperation at the international level. 
Together, these works represent three decades of functional scholarship on core questions 
regarding the continuing relevance of international cooperation, although from different 
theoretical positions.238 The importance of cooperation among developing countries in general, 
and of technical cooperation in particular, has been recognised in a series of declarations, 
resolutions, and decisions of the UN.239   
Notably, the theoretical trend upon which international cooperation is built follows either 
the North-South or South-South model.240 While there exist conceptual underpinnings that 
support the two, in practice the favoured option is that of the conventional North-South model. 
More importantly, in 1978, recognising that technical cooperation among developing countries 
is a critical means for fostering national and collective self-reliance, delegations from 138 
countries adopted the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical 
Cooperation among developing countries.241 This resulted in the establishment of the UN’s 
Unit for South-South Cooperation in 1978.242  
                                                 
235  Robert O Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton 
University Press 1984). 
236  Ernst B Haas, Beyond the Nation-state: Functionalism and International Organisation (Stanford University 
Press 1964). 
237  Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (OUP 1990). 
238  For further analysis of these theories see Anne L Herbert, ‘Cooperation in International Relations: A 
Comparison of Keohane, Haas and Franck’ (1996) 14 Berkeley Journal of International Law 222–238. 
239  See, eg, UNGA Res 32/183 (19 December 1977) UN Doc A/RES/32/183; UNGA Res 33/134 (19 December 
1978) UN Doc A/RES/33/134; UNGA Res 46/159 (19 December 1991) UN Doc A/RES/46/159; UNGA 
Res 49/96 (19 December 1994) UN Doc A/RES/49/96; UNGA Res 50/119 (20 December 1995) UN Doc 
A/RES/50/119;  UNGA Res 52/205 (18 December 1997) UN Doc A/RES/52/205. 
240  Piera Tortora, ‘Common Ground between South-South and North-South Co-Operation Principles’ (Issues 
Brief, OECD 2011) 1 <www.oecd.org/dac/stats/49245423.pdf> accessed 1 July 2016. 
241  United Nations Conference on Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries, ‘Buenos Aires Plan of 
Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Co-operation among Developing Countries’ (United 
Nations 1978) endorsed by UNGA Res 33/134 (19 December 1978) UN Doc A/RES/33/134. 
242  See, United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation <ssc.undp.org/content/ssc.html> accessed 14 July 
2016. 
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Under the same principle, the UN upgraded this institution to the High-level Committee 
on South-South Cooperation, as a multilateral support body to promote South–South 
collaboration within its agencies.243 Notwithstanding its doctrinal sense, support from the 
international community, and advocates’ argument for developing countries to resort to the 
South-South model, African policymakers engage in traditional North-South cooperation to a 
substantial degree. In other words, African policymakers may in theory support the South-
South model, but in practice this is neglected. This trend confounds logic. This paucity exists 
because when it comes to institutional and human capacity, the notion of development follows 
the model known in developed countries. 
This practice is inconsistent with the position recognised by the UN’s Office of the 
Special Adviser on Africa, which reaffirmed the importance of these partnerships for enhancing 
and consolidating the growth of the continent.244 The Office, therefore, encourages and 
promotes the convening of forums on South-South and triangular cooperation with a view to 
enabling African countries to benefit from the sharing of experiences, technical assistance as 
well as cooperation on the part of other developing and emerging countries.245 
I BUILDING INSTITUTIONAL, TECHNICAL, AND HUMAN RESOURCED-BASED ASPECTS 
CAPACITY OF THE JUDICIARY 
There is no doubt that human rights norms can be interpreted to promote access to affordable 
medicines for public health protection. However, in order to determine the proper normative 
relationship between IP law and the right to health, one must understand how they relate to one 
another. In other words, one must determine the appropriate structure of a human rights 
argument context that addresses unreasonable IP protection. This conceptual view is important, 
as courts of law in several countries have demonstrated sensitivity to promoting the interest of 
the public health in their judgements and pronouncements.246 Therefore, the judiciary remains 
                                                 
243  UNGA Res 35/202 (16 December 1980) UN Doc A/RES/35/202. 
244  The Office of the Special Adviser on Africa (OSAA) was officially established on 1 May 2003 by the 
Secretary-General (UN Doc ST/SGB/2003/6), in line with UNGA Res 57/7 (4 November 2002) UN Doc 
A/RES/57/7. 
245  Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, ‘North-South, South-South and Triangular Cooperation’ 
<www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/partnerships/south.shtml> accessed 1 July 2016. 
246  Norheim and Wilson (n 48). See also Ochieng (n 189); Dickson Tapela and Others v Attorney General and 
Others, High Court Civil Case No MAHGB-000057-14, 22 August 2014 (High Court of Botswana (BHC)) 
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an important organ of government that could provide an interpretation as to how aggressive IP 
law-making undermines or produces violations of the right to health.  
With this, the logical deduction often advanced by some scholars is that an efficient 
judiciary remains a major component of access to medicines. However, this cannot be 
achieved, as the capacity of judges to come up with appropriate remedies requires professional 
competence and creativity, access to relevant knowledge, and command of the necessary legal 
remedies. There is no doubt that in Africa, the judiciary as an institution is still new and 
generally in a phase of initial experimentation. Therefore, given the evolving nature of the issue 
of inadequate access to medicines, a problem framed within human rights norms, the need for 
institutional training of judges has long been felt.  
With income improving and populations growing, and as countries implement their IP 
obligation under TRIPS, Africa will soon be the hotbed for IP-related litigations. The issues of 
trade law that are likely to come before courts in a dynamic IP sector will pose a major technical 
challenge for judges in these countries. That is, if the judges lack the capacity to understand 
the intricate interface between IP and human rights and the need to circumvent IP protection, 
which TRIPS envisages as private rights, in favour of the overriding interest of the protection 
of the public, which is a major principle of the patent regime under TRIPS by virtue of Article 
8, access to medicines cannot be realised. 
There is, therefore, a need to sensitise judges through a combination of introducing the 
normative framework, experience sharing with counterparts in jurisdictions with similar 
challenges, and exposure to IP matters that conflict with human rights. It is only with this 
approach that the judiciary can be positioned as a crucial institution in promoting access to 
medicines through the development, interpretation, and enforcement of applicable human 
rights norms.  
Importantly, with a view to enhancing its technical assistance mandate for IP matters, 
WIPO, in 2015, specifically launched a thematic project proposal aimed at targeting the 
                                                 
(securing access to HIV treatment for prisoners), affd Court of Appeal Civil Case No CACGB-096-14, 26 
August 2015 (Court of Appeal of Botswana (BCA)). 
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capacity building of the judiciary directly.247 However, there are concerns as to whether these 
training programmes are meant to encourage the judicial officials of developing countries and 
LDCs to enforce IP rights without considering the development concerns or public interest 
issues.248 
J JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE TO THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC INTERESTS WITHIN THE 
INDIAN PATENT LAW 
At the heart of the Indian patent regime lie several provisions aimed at protecting the interest 
of the public. For instance, section 84(1) of the Indian Patent Act249 hints that the granted patent 
must satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public, including a requirement that the patent 
must be reasonably affordable to the public. This is a legal requirement on the part of patentees. 
Thus, the public interest norm—a principle on which the grant of patent rights sits —implies 
that patents granted must not impede the protection of the public interest, but rather should act 
as an instrument to promote the reasonable legitimate expectations of the public.250  
Notably, according to the logical view of the Indian Patent Act, patents are granted not 
in the commercial interest of patentees but rather the fundamental welfare of the public. 
Additionally, section 83(d) of the Indian Patent Act provides that: ‘patents granted do not 
impede protection of public health and nutrition and should act as instrument to promote public 
interests especially in sectors of vital importance for socio-economic and technological 
development of India’. Therefore, consistent with the goal of public interest protection, the 
relevant provision of the Indian Patent Act provides that ‘patents granted do not in any way 
prohibit Central Government in taking measures to protect public health’.251 
                                                 
247  WIPO (CDIP), ‘Cooperation on Intellectual Property Rights Education and Professional Training with 
Judicial Training Institutes in Developing and Least Developed Countries’ (8 September 2015) WIPO Doc 
CDIP/16/7, annex (addressing WIPO’s Development Agenda Recommendations 3, 10, and 45). 
248  KM Gopakumar, ‘WIPO: Proposal for Training of Judiciary Raises Concerns’ (Third World Network, 13 
April 2016) <www.twn.my/title2/intellectual_property/info.service/2016/ip160403.htm> accessed 16 
August 2016. 
249  Patents Act, 1970 (India). 
250  Bryan Mercurio and Mitali Tyagi, ‘Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding 
Question of the Legality of Local Working Requirements’ (2010) 19 Minnesota Journal of International Law 
275, 281. 
251  Patents Act, 1970 (India) s 83(e). 
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The judiciary remains an important institution that is playing a critical role in shaping the 
scope of protection and public interest safeguards contained in the Indian Patents Act, despite 
many of the flexibilities in its patent regime being relatively new to Indian patent law. There 
have already been a number of decisions that have the potential to foster a unique line of Indian 
jurisprudence that could inject fundamental public health considerations into how patent law 
should be interpreted. 
K THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC INTERESTS WITHIN THE 
INDIAN PATENT REGIME 
Since the initial High Court judgement in the Novartis case issued in 2007,252 there have been 
a number of developments that help illustrate the critical role that the Indian judiciary is playing 
in promoting the public interest in the patent system pursuant to the TRIPS provisions. To start 
with, a decision by the Indian Patent Office in response to a pre-grant opposition filed by the 
Indian Network for People Living with HIV/AIDS (INP+) rejected the patent application of 
Boehringer Ingelheim (BI) relating to a paediatric formulation of nevirapine, a critical first-
line AIDS medicine, as inconsistent with the reasonable requirements of the public.253  
In considering the patent opposition, the patent office cited the Madras High Court’s 
judgment in the Novartis case, and agreed with the opponents that it needed to ‘give a strict 
interpretation of patentability criteria, as a decision… thereof shall affect the fate of people 
suffering from HIV/AIDS for want of essential medicine’.254 Applying these strict criteria, the 
patent office concluded that BI’s application, which covered a pharmaceutical composition of 
a specific crystal form of nevirapine along with a variety of common inactive pharmaceutical 
ingredients, could not be considered an invention under Indian law under both sections 3(d) 
and 3(e), the latter excluding ‘mere admixtures’ from patentability.255 
                                                 
252  Novartis AG and Another v Union of India and Others, WP (C) 24759 and 24760 of 2006, HC Mad, 6 August 
2007 (High Court of Madras, India (IHCM)). 
253  Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc v Indian Network for People Living with HIV/AIDS, 11 June 
2008 (Indian Patent Office, Delhi)  
<static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/129694/5244519/1262645549853/Boehringer+Ingelheim+-
+Nevipramine+Hemihydrate.pdf?token=qYvJH%2F9yRtoYR7vYjOdg3vemGXc%3D> accessed 28 
November 2016. 
254  ibid 3. 
255  ibid 13, 14. 
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Additionally, in patent infringement cases, some courts have refused to automatically 
hand out injunctive relief that prohibits the commercialisation of a patented product. Such 
injunctive relief can be sought as a remedy by multinational pharmaceutical companies against 
generic producers. The Indian courts have argued, as have the US courts since the eBay Inc v 
MercExchange LLC Supreme Court decision,256 that they must weigh up the public interest in 
choosing the appropriate remedy, as the familiar principle of equity suggests that the public 
interest may not be served by an injunction.  
The Indian courts have argued that the public interest includes the potential risk of 
denying patients access to life-saving medicines. As noted above, the provisions of the Indian 
Patent Act provide a lot of room for interpretation and each time the judiciary plays the role of 
final arbitrator on disputes related to the interpretation of law and facts, the public interest is 
considered.257 In the last five years, the courts have examined three important issues with 
regard to patent law. As mentioned earlier, the Madras High Court dismissed the petition of 
Novartis, which challenged the constitutional validity of section 3(d) of the Patents Act.  
In another case, the Single Bench258 and Division Bench259 dismissed a petition by 
Hoffmann-La Roche, seeking a preliminary injunction against a generic manufacturing 
company to prevent it from producing the anticancer drug erlotinib. While dismissing the 
preliminary injunction, the Single Bench noted that:  
[T]he court is of the opinion that as between the two competing public interests, that is, the 
public interest in granting an injunction to affirm a patent during the pendency of an 
infringement action, as opposed to the public interest in access for the people to a lifesaving 
drug, the balance has to be tilted in favour of the latter. The damage or injury that would occur 
to the plaintiff in such case is capable of assessment in monetary terms. However, the injury to 
the public would be deprived of the defendant’s product, which may lead to shortening of lives 
of several unknown persons, who are not parties to the suit, and which damage cannot be 
restituted in monetary terms, is not only uncompensatable, it is irreparable.260 
                                                 
256  eBay Inc (n 179).  
257  KM Gopakumar, ‘Product Patents and Access to Medicines in India: A Critical Review of the 
Implementation of TRIPS Patent Regime’ (2010) 3 Law and Development Review 326, 357.  
258  F Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd and Another v Cipla Limited 148 (2008) DLT 598 (Delhi High Court, India 
(IHCD)). 
259  F Hoffmann-La Roche and Another v Cipla Limited, FA (OS) 188 of 2008, HC Del, 24 April 2009 (IHCD). 
260  Hoffmann-La Roche (n 258) [86]. 
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The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, while dismissing the appeal against the 
order of the Single Bench, found that the petitioner, Hoffmann-La Roche, agreed with the 
Single Bench judge on the question of public interest while issuing the injunction. The Division 
Bench held that:  
[T]he question of general public access in our country to life saving drugs assumes great 
significance and the adverse impact on such access which the grant of injunction in a case like 
the instant one is likely to have, would have to be accounted for. This Court finds no ground to 
differ with the reasoning or the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge on this 
aspect.261 
The Division Bench also found that the petitioner had suppressed material facts and failed 
to disclose the complete invention. Therefore the court dismissed the petition with cost and 
ordered to pay the defendant Rs. 500,000 (approximately USD7,500).262 Both the Hoffmann-
La Roche judgement and the INP+ decisions explicitly placed the need to promote access to 
medicines as background considerations within the primary legal framework of the patent law. 
The Hoffmann-La Roche decision stated: 
[U]ndoubtedly, India entered into the TRIPS regime, and amended her laws to fulfil her 
international obligations, yet the court has to proceed and apply the laws of this country, which 
oblige it to weigh all relevant factors. In this background the Court cannot be unmindful of the 
right of the general public to access lifesaving drugs which are available and for which such 
access would be denied if the injunction were granted.263 
The third important case decided by the Delhi High Court concerned Bayer’s writ petition 
seeking court intervention to prevent the Drug Controller General of India (DCGI) from issuing 
a manufacturing licence to generic companies for patented medicine.264 This was an attempt to 
establish a ‘patent linkage’ in India through court orders to prevent the issuance of 
manufacturing licences for patented medicines. This would have turned the DCGI into a de 
facto enforcing authority for patented medicines. Such a linkage between patent and drug 
registration would have undermined the TRIPS flexibilities, such as early working (Bolar 
provision),265 parallel importation, and compulsory licences. While dismissing the writ petition 
                                                 
261  Hoffmann-La Roche (n 259) [85].  
262  ibid [87]. 
263  Hoffmann-La Roche (n 258) [85]. 
264  Bayer Corp and Others v Union of India and Others, WP (C) 7833 of 2008, HC Del, 18 August 2009 (IHCD). 
See also Gopakumar (n 257) 358.   
265  Patent Act (RSC, 1985, c P-4) (Canada), s 55.2(1). This ‘regulatory review provision’ was the subject of a 
WTO dispute in WTO, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products—Report of the Dispute 
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with costs of Rs. 600,000 (approximately USD9,000) to be paid to the respondents, the court 
remarked that:  
[T]his court is constrained to observe that the present litigation was what may be characterized 
as a speculative foray; an attempt to “tweak” public policies through court mandated regimes. 
The petitioner doubtless is possessed of vast resources and can engage in such pursuits. Yet, 
often, these attempts, even unsuccessful in the ultimate analysis, achieve short-term goals of 
keeping out competitors, through interim orders. That short term objective has been achieved, 
and the petitioner has successfully stalled an independent examination of Cipla’s application.266 
Significantly, in 2009, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court affirmed the decision 
of the Single Bench.267  
In the Natco v Bayer268 case, Bayer made several attempts to oppose the granting of a 
compulsory licence. Not satisfied with the IPAB decision, Bayer subsequently moved to the 
High Court in Bombay, India, seeking relief by way of a writ petition, which sought to 
challenge the decision by the IPAB on the grounds that it was arbitrary, which was 
dismissed.269 Not satisfied with the High Court’s decision, Bayer appealed to the Indian 
Supreme Court with a special leave petition. Bayer submitted that the Bombay High Court, in 
its judgment, had made unsustainable findings on several questions of law and fact.270 Bayer 
contended, for instance, that while considering whether the patentee under section 84(1) of the 
Indian Patent Act had met the reasonable requirements of the public, the Bombay High Court 
had erred in its interpretation of the law. Bayer further claimed that compulsory licensing was 
a violation of its patent rights consistent with Article 27(1) of TRIPS.271 Refusing to accept the 
submission, the bench, comprising Justice Ranjan Gogoi and Justice Rohintan Nariman, on 12 
December 2014 dismissed the Special Leave Petition.272 The Court, on 12 December 2014, 
                                                 
Panel (17 March 2000) WT/DS/114/R. Note that the Panel confirmed the consistency of the ‘Bolar 
Exception’ with TRIPS at [7.105]. 
266  Bayer Corp (IHCD) (n 264) [53]. 
267  Bayer Corp and Another v Union of India, LPA 443 of 2009, HC Del, 9 February 2010 (IHCD). 
268  Bayer Corp (ICP) (n 54). 
269  Bayer Corp (BHC) (n 59). 
270  Bayer Corp (ISC) (n 60). 
271  ibid.  
272  ibid. 
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made the following order: ‘In the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to interfere. The 
Special Leave Petition is dismissed, keeping all questions of law open’.273  
India is the perfect demonstration of the fact that the TRIPS Agreement leaves 
developing countries far more flexibility in the area of medicine than is generally recognised. 
The creative interpretation and extensive implementation of flexibilities has helped India to 
reach a good balance between a harmonised IP and public health protection.274 Given the 
Novartis case in particular and several other judicial decisions mentioned above, Africa should 
be able to approach India for South-South judicial cooperation with a view to training judges 
in the protection of public health in IP-related matters. Central to this recommendation is the 
fact that the Indian judiciary has, through successive decisions, understood that the reasonable 
requirement of the public pursuant to patent law is subject to human rights considerations for 
the promotion of access to medicines. 
L SOUTH–SOUTH COOPERATION WITH INDIA FOR THE TRAINING OF JUDGES: A POLICY 
OPTION FOR AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
One central question is whether India is ready to provide technical assistance to African 
countries and, if so, on what terms. It must be noted that African and Asian countries have a 
long-standing operational framework for cooperation on the Bandung principles, which sets 
out a comprehensive conceptual structure of technical cooperation among developing 
countries.275 Specifically, India and Africa have a long history of partnership,276 even if this is 
not effective. In Africa and India, domestic expectations and democratic structures 
have evolved to a point where both sides need partners willing to work with them towards the 
fulfilment of their development requirements. The solidarity and complementarity between 
India and Africa reflect the new aspirations of their people. Driven by the time-tested principles 
of mutual benefit, understanding, and equality, the heightened pace of engagement marks the 
emergence of new dynamics in South-South cooperation. 
                                                 
273  Bayer Corp (ISC) (n 60).  
274  Sidonie Descheemaeker, ‘India, Pharmacy of the Developing World IP, Trade and the Access to Medicine’ 
(2012–13) 49 Jura Falconis 543, 564. 
275  Asian-African Conference of Bandung, ‘Final Communiqué’ (24 April 1955)  
<franke.uchicago.edu/Final_Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf> accessed 1 July 2016. 
276  Ian Taylor, ‘India’s Economic Diplomacy in Africa’ in Ajay Kumar Dubey and Aparajita Biswas (eds), India 
and Africa’s Partnership: A Vision for a New Future (Springer 2016) 99, 102. 
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In recognition of the growing importance of Indian-African ties and prospects for much 
closer development cooperation, it was decided to convene regular India-Africa Forum 
Summits (IAFS).277 These Summits have laid the foundation of a new architecture for a 
structured interaction and cooperation between India and Africa.278 One of the strongest 
focuses of the current Indian partnership with Africa is the empowerment of people through 
capacity building and human resources development, which is specifically highlighted under 
the Indian-Africa Framework of Cooperation.279  
It is worth noting that India’s cooperation with Africa has had a positive impact in 
Africa.280 Importantly, India currently provides the world with one-fifth of its generics, of 
which about half are sent abroad to other developing countries, and Africa is a major 
beneficiary.281 India has a key role in Africa’s development process and lays particular 
emphasis on capacity building in different African countries. India recognises Africa’s need 
for human resources development in overcoming the gap in development.  
In the multilateral sphere, India has been a very active proponent of, and willing 
participant in, programmes such as the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa 
                                                 
277  The first of these summits was held from 4–8 April 2008 in New Delhi, India. The second summit was held 
in in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 2011, and the third was again held in New Delhi, India. 
278  Ruchika Singh Malyan and Lokesh Jindal, ‘Capacity Building in Education Sector: An Exploratory Study 
on Indian and African Relations’ (2014) 157 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 296, 301. 
279  India-Africa Forum Summit, ‘Delhi Declaration 2015’ (29 October 2015) [vii], [viii]. 
<mea.gov.in/Uploads/PublicationDocs/25980_declaration.pdf> accessed 16 August 2016. 
280  UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2010: South-South Cooperation: Africa and the New 
Forms of Development Partnership (United Nations 2010) 17 (mentioning trade and investment, technical 
assistance, and infrastructure finance through loans). 
281  Campaign for Access to Essential Medicines, ‘Examples of the Importance of India as the “Pharmacy of 
the World”’ 
<www.msfaccess.org/sites/default/files/MSF_assets/Access/Docs/ACCESS_briefing_PharmacyForDevelo
pingWorld_India_ENG_2007.pdf> accessed 14 August 2016, stating that 80 per cent of ARVs MSF uses 
are purchased in India and distributed in treatment projects in over 30 countries. Approx. 50 per cent of the 
essential medicines that UNICEF distributes in developing countries comes from India. 75–80 per cent of 
all medicines distributed by the International Dispensary Association (IDA) to developing countries are 
manufactured in India. Globally, 70 per cent of the treatment for patients in 87 developing countries, 
purchased by UNICEF, IDA, the Global Fund (GFATM), and the Clinton Foundation since July 2005 has 
come from Indian suppliers. PEPFAR, the US President’s AIDS initiative also purchases ARVs from India 
for distribution in developing countries, thus resulting in cost-savings of up to 90 per cent. 89 per cent of 
the generic ARVs approved by the US Food and Drug Administration for PEPFAR are from India. 
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Programme.282 India is a full member of the Africa Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF).283 
ACBF was established by African Governments and their Development Partners to help build 
sustainable human and institutional capacity for good governance and economic development 
management. To date, the Foundation has empowered governments, parliaments, civic society, 
the private sector, and higher education institutions in more than 45 countries and 6 regional 
economic communities. ACBF supports capacity development through investment, technical 
support, knowledge generation, and sharing across Africa. India became the first Asian country 
to become a full member of the ACBF and pledged USD1 million towards the foundation’s 
sustainable development.284 
Stating India’s commitment to Africa’s capacity building in his special address during 
the inaugural session of the two-day 11th CII-EXIM Bank Conclave on India Africa Project 
Partnership organised in New Delhi, General (Rtd) VK Singh, the Indian Minister of State for 
External Affairs, said that India’s economic resurgence will have a continued positive bearing 
on Africa’s development initiatives. He said that ‘capacity building is an important element of 
cooperation between India and Africa and this engagement is required to forge development 
with the continent’.285 He further reiterated that: 
[W]e feel that capacity building will always remain as a very important element of our 
cooperation. Our approach of development has always been because we believe that when you 
partner for development you must build capacities and capabilities in that country and it should 
not be extracted in your engagement.286 
Consequently, India has augmented its development package pursuant to capacity 
building for Africa. India’s support for the New Partnership for Africa’s development initiative 
since its inception in 2001 is another step that is indicative of its efforts to assist Africa in 
                                                 
282  Malyan and Jindal (n 278) 299. 
283  ibid 300. 
284  Sanusha Naidu, ‘Upping the ante in Africa: India’s increasing footprint across the continent’ in Emma 
Mawdsley and Gerard McCann (eds), India in Africa: Changing Geographies of Power (Pambuzuka Press 
2011) 48, 60. 
285  PTI, ‘Capacity building vital for India-Africa cooperation: VK Singh’ (The Economic Times, 14 March 2016) 
<articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2016-03-14/news/71509489_1_vk-singh-india-africa-india-africa-
summit> accessed 15 August 2016. 
286  ibid. 
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achieving its development goals.287 Human capacity and institutional building initiatives, 
including those relating to the judiciary and the health and pharmaceutical sectors, were 
formally identified as a joint priority.288 More specifically, India pledged to provide Africa with 
extensive programmes, capacity building, training and skills development, the setting up of 
training institutes, and the provision of scholarships for Africans to study at Indian institutions 
of higher learning.289   
For historical reasons, the legal systems of India may be different from countries in 
Africa. Within this conceptual view, the most fundamental question is whether, given the lack 
of cooperation in the judicial arena and the difference in the structural underpinnings pursuant 
to their legal traditions, capacity building in the judiciary can be effective. Nevertheless, these 
concerns do not arise because several developed countries with different legal traditions 
continue to give various forms of technical assistance to African countries. A classic example 
is the Swiss-Ghana Intellectual Property Project.290  
Remarkably, India has some good institutes, under its central government control within 
the Ministry of Commerce and Industry,291 which are engaged in conducting training 
programmes relating to IPRs and could be used to train Africans, as nothing of this kind exists 
anywhere in Africa. More importantly, under the 2016 Indian IP policy, the country stresses 
the need to enhance international and bilateral cooperation and coordinate with Indian Missions 
                                                 
287  Ajay Debey, ‘Looking West 3: Africa’ in David Scott (eds), Handbook of India's International Relations 
(Routledge 2011) 189, 195. 
288  James Thuo Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes (CUP 2011) 416. 
289  Nivedita Ray, ‘Third India-Africa Forum Summit: Priorities, Proposals and Prospects’ (Issue Brief, Indian 
Council of World Affairs, 16 November 2015) 5, 6 
<www.icwa.in/pdfs/IB/2014/ThirdIndiaAfricforumsummitIB16112015.pdf> accessed 16 August 2016. 
See also Navdeep Suri, ‘India and Africa: Contemporary Perspective’ in Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta 
(eds), Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities (Academic Foundation 2007) 507, 515, stating 
1 billion worth of assistance including training. 
290  Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property, ‘Swiss-Ghana IP Project, Phase II (SGIP II)’ 
<www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Juristische_Infos/e/factsheet_ghana.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016. 
291  The Rajiv Gandhi National Institute of Intellectual Property Management 
<www.ipindia.nic.in/rgniipm.htm> accessed 28 November 2016; National Judicial Academy India 
<http://www.nja.nic.in/> accessed 19 August 2016. 
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abroad to follow IP developments and advice on IP-related matters.292 The policy further states 
that continued efforts should be made towards the promotion of technical cooperation with IP 
offices in other countries in areas such as capacity building and human resource 
development.293 Having committed to providing African countries with human and 
institutional capacity building initiatives, African countries are free to request that India tailors 
this technical assistance to the training of judges in IP matters. 
M CONCLUSION 
As seen above, by virtue of the dispensation given to LDC members of the WTO by the TRIPS 
Council, they generally have the right not to enforce patents on pharmaceutical products. 
Notwithstanding this, LDCs in Africa have notably failed to implement the flexibilities inherent 
in the TRIPS Agreement to promote their public health interests. This is largely due to the fact 
that several capacity issues ranging from institutional to resource-based inadequacies exist. 
Admittedly, today, development cooperation is populated by more actors, and is delivered 
through several modalities.294 In fact, the diversified development cooperation landscape offers 
developing countries a wider array of options from which to choose, with large potential 
benefits to their development processes.  
Throughout this analysis, it has been shown that international cooperation could help 
developing countries, and in particular LDCs in Africa, to gain capacity either through the 
North-South or South-South model.295 However, as they currently choose the path of the North-
South model, the capacity building initiatives that exist today have not translated into actual 
capacity, or capacity has not improved substantially. Unfortunately, even with substantive 
common ground among developing countries, which calls for stronger collaboration, the 
principles of South-South cooperation have so far received little attention, although there is no 
                                                 
292  Indian Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion, ‘National Intellectual Property Rights Policy’ (12 
May 2016) [4.15] <https://www.vtpckarnataka.gov.in/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/National_IPR_Policy_12.05.2016.pdf> accessed 19 August 2016. 
293  ibid [4.11]. 
294  ‘Pharmaceutical Production and Related Technology Transfer: Landscape Report’ (World Health 
Organisation, 2011) 35  
<http://www.who.int/phi/publications/Local_production_and_access_to_medicines.pdf> accessed 10 April 
2017. 
295  UNGA, ‘Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development: Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August 
– 4 September 2002’ (2002) UN Doc A/CONF.199/20, [90(d)], [90(e)]. 
Page 51 of 53 Manu — Interpretation of TRIPS 19 November 2016 
 
 
doubt that the South-South model could be a logical platform for African countries to build 
capacity.  
What we learn immediately from this vacuum is that there is a lack of dynamism in 
thinking, and this has tended to render the South-South model redundant. Thus, African 
countries generally lack innovative momentum or motivation to pursue the South-South model 
in their governance arrangements for promoting cooperation with other like-minded countries. 
This exists partly because the trend known to many policymakers is that of the North-South 
model, which is often linked to comparatively rich and powerful states. Nevertheless, it appears 
that developed countries have commonly failed to inform developing countries as to their right 
to implement the TRIPS safeguard measures to obtain essential medicines, which remains a 
component of the right to health.  
Significantly, this is not to suggest that developing countries should ignore completely 
the North-South model, however, in thinking about policy direction a key distinction is whether 
South-South model may not provide them with a practical policy experience necessary for the 
implementation of compulsory licensing to obtain essential medicines. For instance, the 
experience of Brazil, India, and Thailand provide an illustrative example of this point, except 
that in the context of Africa the situation is more complex given several internal capacity 
constraints, including unviable local industries and small market size.296 Moreover, there are 
certain general categories of legal tradition that differentiate the legal systems of Africa from 
that of India. Still, the judiciary, as seen in the case of India, remains a significant institution 
that could play an active role in the interpretation of TRIPS provisions consistent with human 
rights norms to promote access to medicines. However, there is no doubt that the African 
judiciary simply lacks the capacity in IP matters.297 It is on this basis that the author concludes 
that it is time to test a new model in capacity building based on South-South judicial 
cooperation with India. 
This contention is premised on the understanding that judicial cooperation with India 
may offer African countries a logical platform for them to build capacity to promote a health 
                                                 
296  Dirceu B Greco and Mariangela Simão, ‘Brazilian Policy of Universal Access to AIDS Treatment: 
Sustainability Challenges and Perspectives’ (2007) 21(Suppl 4) AIDS 37, 41. 
297  See text to n 61. 
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sensitive interpretation of IP regimes consistent with human rights instruments as the Indian 
judiciary has done consistently. A more advanced form of cooperation that could be used is 
mutual technical assistance. This draws conceptually on the principle of mutual recognition 
based on the mutual trust that already exists between African countries and India. Within this 
essence, African countries could reach out to India in order to set up specific structures 
to facilitate mutual assistance and support cooperation between the two.  
As WTO members, developed countries have an obligation to provide technical and 
financial assistance under Article 67 of TRIPS in meeting the obligation underlined in Article 
66(2) of the Agreement.298 This is a legal duty, which is also codified by the DA under WIPO. 
Usually, technical assistance under WIPO’s mandate reflects a measure that appears to be a 
central component of the organisation’s deliberations, which demonstrates the potential 
sensitivity and importance of domestic IP regulatory policymaking. The TRIPS Agreement, in 
its Preamble and in Article 66(2), recognises the special needs of developing countries, LDC 
members in particular, in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of 
laws and regulations in order to enhance innovation and the technology infrastructure to 
promote domestic socio-economic welfare.  
In order to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement, Article 67 of TRIPS stipulates 
that: 
[D]eveloped country Members shall provide, on request and on mutually agreed terms and 
conditions, technical and financial cooperation in favour of developing and least-developed 
country Members. Such cooperation shall include assistance in the preparation of laws and 
regulations on the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as on the 
prevention of their abuse, and shall include support regarding the establishment or 
reinforcement of domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters, including the training 
of personnel. 
It is clear from this provision that developed countries have an affirmative legal duty, 
subject to request and on mutually agreed terms and conditions, to provide technical and 
financial cooperation in favour of developing and LDC members. While the language of TRIPS 
suggests that technical capacity building is a condition for TRIPS to achieve its intended 
purpose of contributing to the promotion of technological innovation, the transfer and 
                                                 
298   WTO, ‘Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health’ WT/L/540, 2 September 2003 [6(ii)&7] 
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dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological 
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and a balance of rights 
and obligations, it follows that capacity building remains demand driven.  
Therefore, in this particular case, Africa should be the principal actor in the process, and 
as a matter of legal logic, developed countries will not generally object to any requests that are 
made regarding the building of national initiatives on capacity consistent with the objectives 
of the WIPO DA for IP matters. This conclusion is relevant, as the guiding principles 
established by the Doha Declaration pursuant to the TRIPS flexibilities and also reaffirmed in 
the 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration recognised the importance of technical assistance and 
capacity building for developing countries and LDCs. 
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